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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, a
United States Corporation,
Plaintift:

Case No. CV-OC 0917209

OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
H. CRAIG VAN ENGELEN and KRISTEN
VAN ENGELEN,
Defendants.

The Defendants H. Craig Van Engelen and Kristen Van Engelen ("Defendants" or "the
Van Engelens"), by and through their counsel of record, oppose the Motion for Summary
Judgment of the PlaintiffWashinf.,rton Federal Savings ("WFS" or "the Bank"). As will be
shown, genuine issues of material fact prevent the entry of judgment. This opposition supported
by the Affidavit of H. Craig Van Engelen, and the Affidavit of Kristen Van Engelen, previously
tiled on or about May l3, 2010, prior to their deposition in this case, as well as the Affidavit of
Counsel, filed contemporaneously herewith.

OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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1.

INTRODUCTION

In this action, the Bank is attempting to enforce a purported continuing Guarantee which
allegedly makes the Van Engelen's personally liable for loans entered into by their real estate
development company. However, the Bank made multiple misrepresentations in which it stated
that the loans were not secured by a personal guarantee, and has concealed the existence of the
continuing Guarantee. There are therefore genuine issues of material fact concerning whether
the Bank's affirmative misrepresentations and nondisclosures (1) constitute a waiver ofthe
Guarantee, (2) estop the Bank from enforcing the Guarantee, (3) constitute unfair and deceptive
trade practices, (4) cause the Bank to have unclean hands such that it cannot enforce the
guarantee, (5) render the Guarantee voidable, (6) cause the guarantee to be unenforceable, (7)
discharge the Van Engelens, (8) constitute a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, or (9) fraudulently induced the Van Engelens to cause VED to the entered transaction(s).
There is also a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Guarantee was intended to extend
to the loan at issue, whether the claims can be set oft: and whether the Bank has failed to
mitigate the claimed or alleged damage. If anyone of these affirmative defenses is established,
the Bank cannot prevail against the Van Engelens. I Therefore, because there are significant and
genuine issues of material fact, the Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied.

This fully resolves the Bank's argument throughout its briefing that Washington Federal
is entitled to judgment because the Van Engelens signed the Guarantee. If this Guarantee is
unenforceable for any of the reasons alleged, the Guarantee and the alleged waivers contained
therein have no legal effect, regardless of whether or not it was signed. Contrary to the Bank's
singUlar focus otherwise, the Van Engelen' s defenses do not raise questions of contractual
interpretation, but rather genuine questions of material fact about whether, because of the Bank's
o\vn actions, the Bank is prevented from invoking, relying upon, or enforcing the Guarantee.
See, e.g. Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho 765, 771,215 P.3d 485,491 (2009) (court erred in
interpreting contract without considering defense of fraudulent inducement defense which, if
proven, could invalidate the agreement.) It is notable that the Bank does not address the Van
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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II.

DISPUTED FACTS

In 2002, a real estate company o\vned by the Van Engelens, Van Engelen Development
eVED"), borrowed $126,000 from WFS (the "2002 Loans"). (Affidavit of Counsel in
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Labrum Aff"),

~

3, Ex. A

(hereinafter "Sullivan Depo."), p. 64:14-65:16; Affidavit of Craig Van Engelen in Opposition to
Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Craig AfT.") ~ 3); Affidavit of Kristen Van Engelen
in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Kristen Aff.") ~ 3). In the course
of that transaction, the Van Engelens signed2 the personal continuing guarantee which is at issue
in the present lawsuit (the "Guarantee"). (Labrum AfT.
18:20-19:25; Labrum Aff.

~

~

6, Ex. D (hereinafter "Craig Depo."), p.

7, Ex. E (hereinafter "Kristen Depo."), p. 9:16-23.) The Guarantee

is purportedly a "continuing" guarantee by which the Van Engelens allegedly have guaranteed
any present or future obligation ofVED to WFS. Specifically, the alleged Guarantee states that
"Guarantor guarantees payment to Lender of all Obligations that Borrower owes to Lender now
or in the future ... Guarantor's Promise extends to all Obligations which Borrower owes Lender
now or in the future .... Guarantor's Promise shall be a continuing guarantee as to any present
or future Obligations Borrower owes Lender and shall remain effective until Lender actually
receives wTitten notice from Guarantor that Guarantor withdraws Guarantor's Promise."
(Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, ~ 2, Ex. No.1 at

Engelen's assertions that such misrepresentations occurred, but rather argues in a conclusory
fashion (and contrary to the facts outlined herein), that there is no question of material fact.
2
While the Van Engelens have no memory of signing this Guarantee, now that they have
examined the original, they do not dispute that they signed it. (Craig Depo. p. 24: 19-25; Kristen
Depo. p. 9:16-23.)
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-- 3
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Ex. No.7 thereto.) Within approximately one year, VED fully paid the 2002 Loans. (Craig Aff.
at ~ 5; Kristen Aff. at ~ 5.)
VED and the Van Engelens declined to do business with WFS for several years
thereafter because of their belief that the Bank had violated their trust and confidence. (Craig
Depo. p. 24:19-25; Kristen Depo. p. 18:24-19:15 and p. 20:13-16.) In December 2004, a
representative of the Bank approached the Van Engelens about renewing their relationship.
(Craig Aff. at ~ 7.) They were told that the Bank was willing to finance new projects. 3 (ld.)
Later that month, the Van Engelens learned that a real estate development called Carriage Hill
was for sale, and negotiated an agreement to purchase that project. (Craig Aff. at ~ 8; Kristen
Aff. at ~ 8.) They submitted the sale agreement to the Bank and other lending institutions to
solicit loan proposals. (Craig Depo. p. 26:5-27:6.) In February 2005, Bryan Churchill, a loan
officer for the Bank, submitted a loan proposa1. (Labrum Aff. ~ 4, Ex. B (hereinafter "Churchill
4

Depo.), p. 20:6-9; Craig Aff. at ~ 10; Kristen Aff. at ~ 10.) The Bank said that it would require a
down payment of20 percent, and a personal guarantee signed by the Van Engelens. (Craig Ail.
at ~ 10; Kristen AtI. at ~ 10.) Mr. Van Engelen told Mr. Churchill that other lenders had
submitted stronger proposals, (Craig Depo. p. 27:22-23: 13,) and explained that they would
accept a loan from the Bank only if it agreed to the following three terms: (l) ten percent down
to include a credit for commission and the $100,000 seller carry back; (2) no personal guarantee;
and (3) an interest reserve of approximately $50,000. (Craig Depo. p. 34:23-35: 19.) Mr.
Churchill said that he would have to take these terms to the loan committee. (Craig Depo. p.
40:2-3.) A few days later Mr. Churchill told Mr. Van Engelen that the loan had been approved

There is disagreement about the content of this meeting, but Bank representatives agree
that this meeting occurred. (Sullivan Depo. p. 66: 13-68:25.)
4
As Mr. Churchill testified, the Bank chose not to put the loan proposal in writing.
(Churchill Depo. p. 20:10-14.)
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT --4
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with these requested tenns, including not requiring a personal guarantee. (Craig Depo. p. 36:421.)
The Van Engelens caused VED to sign the loan papers with the Bank for six different
loan transactions, in the amount approximately $6 million (the "2005 Loans"), the tenns of
which were consistent with those demanded by the Van Engelens. (Craig Aff. at ~ 13; Kristen
Aff. at '112.) Notably, those documents did not include a personal guarantee, and the loan
documents did not mention or reference any earlier signed guarantee. (Churchill Depo. p. 30: 1234 and 36:4-22; Labrum Aff.

~

5, Ex. C (hereinafter "Henson Depo."), p. 20:11-13.)

At closing the Van Engelens sought assurance that a personal guarantee would not be
required for the 2005 Loans. (Craig Depo. p. 31 :24-33:9.) A representative of the Bank
responded that while the Bank usually required people to sign personal guarantees, the Van
Engelens would not be required to do so because of their long tenn relationship with the Bank
and the longevity of their company. (Craig Depo. p. 31:24-33:9; Kristen Depo. p. 25:23-27:8 and
28:14-23.) The Bank never mentioned the existence of the supposed continuing Guarantee at
any time prior to or at closing, (Churchill Depo. p. 24:11-16 and 41:6-15; Craig Depo. p. 33:2034:3,) although it had numerous opportunities to do so during the lunch to solicit their business,
during loan negotiations, at closing, and during later loan modification negotiations with the
Bank. (Craig Aff. at ~ 22.) Bryan Churchill testified that it would have been his custom and
practice to remind borrowers that the loan was covered by a continuing general guarantee.
However, Mr. Churchill had no specific recollection of giving this reminder to the Van Engelens.
(Churchill Depo. p. 22:2-20.) Neither did Gloria Henson, who may have been present at the
closings. (Henson Depo. p. 13:18-14:1.) The Bank does not have a policy requiring a loan
officer to remind borrowers of a previously signed continuing guarantee. (Sullivan Depo. p.

OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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33:2-17.) In fact, despite the fact that the Bank actually knew of the existence of the guarantee at
the time of the closing of these loans, (Churchill Depo. 36:23-25,) during the loan negotiations
and at closing, the Bank affirmatively represented that the 2005 Loans were not secured by any
personal guarantees. (Craig Depo. p. 31:24-33:9; Kristen Depo. p. 25:23-27:8 and 28:14-23;
Craig Aff. at ~ 13-22; Kristen Aff. at ~ 12-20.) As such, the Van Engelens did not revoke this
alleged Guarantee in reliance upon the assurances of the Bank that the 2005 Loans were not
secured by any personal guarantees. 5 (Craig Aff. at ,-r 20; Kristen Afl. at,-r 19.)
VED ultimately defaulted on the loan, and the Bank conducted a foreclosure sale on the
property. The Bank now seeks the deficiency of $4,452,809.67 from the Van Engelens based on
the alleged continuing Guarantee. While the bank has sold some of the houses on the foreclosed
property, (Churchill Depo. p. 72:5-23,) the Bank has not constructed additional homes on the
lots, (Churchill Depo. p. 72:24-73:3,) and is simply holding the property in anticipation of further
profits from the sale or development of the property in the future. (Churchill Depo. p. 76:1-19.)
III.GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT PRECLUDE SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
Construing the facts liberally in favor of the Defendants, as the Court must, genuine
issues of material fact preclude judgment in favor of the Bank. lvfackay v. Four Rivers Packing

Co., 145 Idaho 408, 410, 179 P .3d 1064, 1066 (2008). 6

Notably, termination of the Guarantee would not have caused the Bank to refuse to enter
into the 2005 Loans agreement with VED, because Bank representatives had twice stated that no
personal guarantee was necessary.
The Defendants made most of these same arguments, contained below, in its initial
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on or about May 13,2010.
Strangely, the Plaintiff has not responded to these arguments in the present iteration of its
Motion. To the extent that the Plaintiff makes arguments in its Reply that it could and should
have made in its initial briefing on this second Motion for Summary Judgment, such arguments
should be stricken.
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 6
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A.

There is a Genuine Issue of Material Fact as to Whether the Bank is
Estopped from Enforcing and/or has Waived the Continuing Guarantees

Because it concealed the existence of the Guarantee and did not correct its misleading
assertions that no personal guarantee secured the 2005 Loans, the Bank has waived the right to
enforce and/or is estopped from enforcing the Guarantee, including any waivers of defenses
contained therein.
1.

Waiver

Waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a kno~n right or advantage.
},Jargaret H Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 253, 256,846 P.2d 904, 907 (1993). Waiver ofa

contract provision is

sho~n

when the intention to waive is clearly present and the party asserting

the waiver shows that he acted in reasonable reliance upon it and that he thereby has altered his
position to his detriment. jViagic Valley Foods. Inc. v. Sun Valley Potatoes, Inc., 134 Idaho 785,
788,10 P.3d 734,737 (2000). Waiver may be inferred from a clear and unequivocal act
manifesting an intent to waive, or from conduct amounting to estoppel. Jl.;fargaret H Wayne
Trust, 123 Idaho at 256,846 P.2d at 907.

The Bank's waiver of the applicability of the Guarantee to the 2005 Loans is clearly
manifested by the statements of at least two of its employees that no personal guarantee would be
required for those Loans. (Craig AtI. at' 12-19; Kristen Aff. at' 12-18; Craig Depo. p. 31 :2433:9; Kristen Depo. p. 25:23-27:8 and 28:14-23.) That this is a waiver is underscored by the fact
that these statements by the Bank were in response to specific inquiries by the Van Engelens,
prior to consummating the transaction, seeking assurance that a personal guarantee would not be
required. (Craig Depo. p. 31:24-33:9; Craig Aff. at, 12-19; Kristen Aff. at' 12-18.) The Van
Engelens reasonably relied on these assurances from bank representatives, particularly when the
loan documents relative to the 2005 Loans were also silent as to the existence of the Guarantee
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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and when the Van Engelens had insisted on terms that would omit any guarantee. (Churchill
Depo. p. 30:12-34 and 36:4-22; Henson Depo. p. 20:11-13; Craig Depo. p. 34:23-35:19.) Under
a waiver analysis, this reliance on the Bank's waiver is reasonable regardless of whether the Van
Engelens knew of or could have discovered the existence of the Guarantee. As outlined above,
the Van Engelens altered their position to their detriment because these assurances induced them
to cause their company to enter into the loan agreements with the Bank without first revoking the
continuing Guarantee. (Craig AtT at ~ 13-20; Kristen Aff. at ~ 12-19.) Consequently, the Bank's
Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied because there are triable material issues of fact
concerning whether the Bank has waived its right to enforce the Guarantee, including any
provisions therein where the Van Engelens are purported to have waived their rights.

2.

Equitable Estoppel

Estoppel is a bar by which a party is precluded trom denying a fact in consequence by his
own previous action which has led another party to conduct himself in such a way that the other
party would suffer. lvfountain States Tel. & Tel. v. Lee, 95 Idaho 134, 135-36,504 P.2d 807,
808-809 (1972). The elements of equitable estoppel are (1) a false representation or concealment
of a material fact with actual or constructive knowledge of the truth; (2) that the party asserting
estoppel did not know or could not discover the truth; (3) that the false representation or
concealment was made with the intent that it be relied upon; and (4) that the person to whom the
representation was made, or from whom the facts were concealed, relied and acted upon the
representation or concealment to his prejUdice. Terrazas v. Blaine County ex rei. Bd. oICom'rs,
147 Idaho 193,200 n. 2,207 P.3d 169,176 n. 2 (2009).
As discussed above, the Bank made both false representations and concealed the
existence of the Guarantee, a material fact that was central to the Van Engelen's decision to
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cause their company to enter into the loan agreement with the bank. (Craig Aff. at ~ 13-20;
Kristen Aff. at ~ 12-19.) The circumstances show that these false representations and
concealment were made with the intent that the Van Engelens rely on these misrepresentations
and nondisclosure so that VEO would enter the loan with the Bank, rather than another lending
institution. The Van Engelens were unaware of the existence of the personal continuing
Guarantee, (Craig Aff. at ~ 18; Kristen Aff. at ~ 17,) and, particularly in light of the Bank's
aftinnative misrepresentations that no guarantee would be required, could not have discovered
the truth. Thus, even if the Van Engelens had remembered their continuing guarantee, they had
no reason to believe this Guarantee applied to the 2005 Loans because the Bank affinnatively
told them the 2005 Loans would not be guaranteed. The Van Engelens actually relied on these
statements by causing VEO to enter into the loan agreement with the Bank, rather than another
lending institution; and by doing so without first revoking the alleged continuing Guarantee.
(Craig AfT. at ~ 13-20; Kristen Aff. at ~ 12-19.) Under these circumstances, the Bank should be
estopped from enforcing said Guarantee.

3.

Quasi Estoppel

The doctrine of quasi-estoppel applies when: (1) the offending party took a different
position than his or her original position, and (2) either (a) the offending party gained an
advantage or caused a disadvantage to the other party; (b) the other party was induced to change
positions; or (c) it would be unconscionable to permit the offending party to maintain an
inconsistent position from one he or she has already derived a benefit or acquiesced in.
Terrazas, 147 Idaho at 200 n. 3, 207 P.3d at 176 n. 3. "Quasi estoppel is distinguished from
equitable estoppel 'in that no concealment or misrepresentation of existing facts on the one side,
no ignorance or reliance on the other, is a necessary ingredient. '" Willig v. State, Dept. of Health
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& Weljare, 127 Idaho 259, 261,899 P.2d 969, 971 (1995) citing Evans v. Idaho State Tax
Comm., 97 Idaho 148,150,540 P.2d 810, 812 (1975). Rather, "[t]he doctrine of quasi estoppel

applies when it would be unconscionable to allow a party to assert a right which is inconsistent
with a prior position. Willig, 127 Idaho at 261,899 P.2d at 971.
The Bank's present position that the continuing Guarantee applies to the 2005 Loans is
opposite from its original position, stated at least two different times, that a personal guarantee
was not required. (Craig Aff. at ~ 12-19; Kristen Aff. at ~ 12-18; Craig Depo. p. 31:24-33:9;
Kristen Depo. p. 25:23-27:8 and 28:14-23.) Its original position was a key tactor in the Van
Engelen's decision to cause their company to enter into the 2005 Loans, (Craig Aff. at ~ 11-20;
Kristen Aff. at ~ 12-19,) thereby giving a significant advantage and benefit to the Bank. It would
be unconscionable to now permit the Bank to change its position concerning the applicability of
the Guarantee to the 2005 Loans after its original position was repeatedly maintained in order to
induce the Van Engelens to cause their company to enter into these loans. Under these
circumstances, the Bank should be estopped from asserting that the Guarantee is applicable to
the 2005 Loans.

B.

There is a Genuine Issue of Material Fact as to Whether the Bank's Actions
Cause it to have Unclean Hands Such that it Cannot Enforce the Guarantee

Under the doctrine of unclean hands, a court may deny equitable relief to a litigant "on
the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent and
deceitful as to the controversy at issue." Campbell v. Kildew, 141 Idaho 640,1648,15 P.3d 731,
739 (2005). The Van Engelen's description of the facts, outlined in detail above, illustrate that
there is at least a genuine issue of fact as to whether the Bank's conduct has been inequitable,
unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent and deceitful. To the extent that the Bank seeks any equitable
remedy in this case, the existence of genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment.
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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c.

There is a Genuine Issue of Material Fact as to Whether the Bank's
Misrepresentations Render the Guarantee Voidable or Unenforceable, or
Discharges the Van Engelens

The Bank's failure to disclose the existence of the continuing Guarantee and failure to
correct the Bank's misrepresentations that no guarantee would be required renders the Guarantee
voidable, unenforceable, and discharges the Van Engelens. See Marine Bank, Nat. Ass 'n v. A1eat

Counter, Inc., 826 F.2d 1577 (7th Cir. 1987 (a question of fact existed on whether a guarantee
was voidable due to misrepresentation). Section 12 of the Restatement (Third) of Suretyship and
Guaranty summarizes this principle, stating that "[i]fthe secondary obligor's assent to the
secondary obligation is induced by fraudulent or material misrepresentation by the obligee upon
which the secondary obligor is justified in relying, the secondary obligation is voidable by the
secondary obligor." Rest. 3d Sur, § 12(1). Notably, "a misrepresentation occurring after the
execution of a continuing guaranty may render the secondary obligation voidable with respect to
extensions of credit subsequent to the misrepresentation." Rest. 3d Sur, § 12, cmt i. See

Sumitomo Bank of California v. Iwasaki, 447 P.2d 956, 958 (Cal. 1968) ("intentional or
negligent misrepresentation or active suppression of the truth, will discharge the surety as to any
subsequently incurred liability.")
The statement by a Bank representative during loan negotiations that the Bank would
accept terms that omitted a guarantee, and at closing that no personal guarantee would be
required, constitute material misrepresentations. The Bank knew that the absence of a personal
guarantee was a crucial and material factor for the Van Engelens, who explicitly stated that they
would cause VED to enter the loan agreement only if the Bank would abandon its insistence on a
personal guarantee. (Craig. Depo. p. 34:23-35:19; Craig Aff. at, 11, 14.) The Van Engelens
were justified in relying on these statements made by Bank representatives, made during the
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course of negotiation and at the consummation of that agreement, about the terms to which the
Bank would assent. The Van Engelens actually relied on these statements by causing VED to
enter into the loan agreement with the Bank, rather than another lending institution; and by doing
so without first revoking the continuing guarantee. (Craig Afl. at, 20; Kristen Aff. at' 19.)
Further, the Bank's non-disclosure of the existence of the continuing Guarantee is also a
material misrepresentation. Nondisclosure constitutes a material misrepresentation when
the oblige: (a) knows facts unknov.n to the secondary obligor that materially
increase the risk beyond that which the oblige has reason to believe the secondary
obligor intends to assume; and (b) has reason to believe that these facts are
unkno\\n to the secondary obligor; and (c) has a reasonable opportunity to
communicate them to the secondary obligor.
Rest. 3d Sur, § 12(3). This principle also appears in the law oftort, wherein "[o]ne who fails to
disclose to another a fact that he knows may justifiably induce the other to act or refrain from
acting in a business transaction is subject to the same liability to the other as though he had
represented the nonexistence of the matter that he has failed to disclose." Rest. 2d Torts §
551 (1). A party to a business transaction has a duty to disclose "matters known to him that he
knows to be necessary to prevent his partial or ambiguous statement of the facts from being
misleading;" "subsequently acquired information that he knows will make untrue or misleading a
previous representation that when made was true or believed to be so;" and "facts basic to the
transaction, ifhe knows that the other is about to enter into it under a mistake as to them, and that
the other, because of the relationship between them, the customs of the trade or other objective
circumstances, would reasonably expect a disclosure of those facts." Rest. 2d Torts § 551(2)(b),
(c), and (e). See Saint Alphonsus Reg'llvfed. Or., Inc. v. Krueger, 124 Idaho 501, 508, 861 P.2d
71,78 (Ct. App. 1992)( citing to the Rest. 2d Torts § 551(2); Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113
Idaho 37, 42,740 P.2d 1022, 1027 (1987) (approving Rest. 2d Torts § 551); Everman Nat'f Bank
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v. United States, 5 Cl. Ct. 118 (U.S. Cl. Ct. 1984) (bank could not enforce guarantee when it
failed to inform guarantor of subsequently acquired information that made untrue or misleading a
previous representation). Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts and Idaho Law, the Bank
clearly had a duty to correct its misleading statements and those false statements upon which it
knew that the Van Engelens were relying. Further, when, as here, "the creditor, rather than
debtor, solicits the surety ... the creditor has a greater duty of disclosure ... If the circumstances
warrant disclosure by the creditor and the creditor fails to disclose, the surety will be
discharged." Peoples Nat'/ Bank of Wash. v. Taylor, 711 P.2d 1021, 1026 (Wash. App. 1985).
In the present case, no personal guarantee was included in the loan documents, and no
mention was made of the existence of the continuing Guarantee. (Churchill Depo. p. 24: 11-16,
30: 12-34: 14,36:4-22, and 41 :6-15; Henson Depo. p. 20: 11-13; Craig Depo. p. 33:20-34:3; Craig
Aff. at ~ 13-22; Kristen Afl at ~ 12-20.) Based on its negotiations with the Van Engelens
concerning guarantees, the Bank had reason to know that the Van Engelens were una'ware of the
continuing Guarantee or at least unaware that it applied to the 2005 Loans. The Bank had many
opportunities to disclose the existence of the continuing Guarantee and its applicability to the
2005 Loans, including during the lunch to solicit the Defendant's business, during the loan
negotiations, and at closing, but it did not do so. Enforcing the continuing Guarantee imposes
liability on the Van Engelens that they did not intend to assume. (Craig Aff. at ~ 14-21; Kristen
Aff. at ~ 13 -19.) Had the Bank disclosed the existence of the continuing Guarantee at the time,
the Van Engelens would have had an opportunity to revoke that Guarantee prior to closing and
effectuate their intent, known and communicated to the Bank, that the 2005 Loans would not be
subject to a personal guarantee. See Sumitomo Bank of California v. lyvasaki, 447 P.2d 956,958
(Cal. 1968) ("[T]he creditor must not misrepresent or conceal facts so as to induce or permit the
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surety to enter or continue in the relationship in reliance on a false impression as to the nature of
the risk.") The Bank had a duty to disclose the continuing Guarantee in order to correct the
misleading statement by the Bank that the loan had been accepted with the loan terms upon
which the Van Engelens had insisted, including not being required to sign a personal guarantee,
and to correct the mistaken belief held by the Van Engelens (which the Bank had fostered) that
no personal guarantee secured the 2005 Loans. Finally, the customs of the industry and the
circumstances are such that the Van Engelens would reasonably expect the disclosure of a
continuing Guarantee. (Craig Aff. at ~ 21; Kristen Aff. at ~ 20.) For all of these reasons, the
Bank's misrepresentations and material nondisclosure create genuine issues of material fact as to
the enforceability of the alleged continuing Guarantee. Consequently, the Bank's Motion for
Summary Judgment must be denied.

D.

There is a Genuine Issue of Material Fact as to Whether the Bank has
Breached its Own Duties of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is an obligation implied in every contract.
See Idaho First Nat. Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 287, 824 P.2d 841, 862
(1991) (discussing the doctrine in the context of guarantees); In re Target Industries, Inc., 328
B.R. 99, 121 (Bankr.D.N.J. 2005) C"Lenders are bound by an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing by virtue of their contractual relationship with a guarantor"). As the Idaho Supreme
Court has said:
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires "that the parties perform in good faith
the obligations imposed by their agreement," Badgett v. Security State Bank, 116
Wash.2d 563,807 P.2d 356, 356 (1991), and a violation of the covenant occurs only
when "either party ... violates, nullifies or significantly impairs any benefit of the ...
contract.. .. " Sorensen v. Comm Tek, Inc., 118 Idaho 664, 669, 799 P.2d 70, 75 (1990);
AfetcalJv. Intermountain Gas Co., 116 Idaho 622,778 P.2d 744 (1989).
Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho at 287, 824 P.2d at 862.
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The Bank breached this duty when it concealed the existence of the Guarantee and did
not correct its misleading assertions during loan negotiations and at closing that the 2005 Loans
would be executed without a personal guarantee. Under the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, banks are obligated to inform even continuing guarantors of new liability when the bank
has reason to believe that the guarantor is unaware of this new liability. An illustrative case is

Lacrosse State Bankv. Estate ofAk·Loone. 359 N.W.2d 179,1984 WL 180170 (Wis.App. 1984)
(unpublished). In that case, a bank sought to enforce a continuing guarantee against an
individual who previously had an interest in the borro\ver company, but who the bank knew no
longer had an interest at the time of the new loan. The court noted that:
Although the bank had no obligation to give any notice to [guarantor of his
potential new liability] under the broad language of [guarantor's] continuing
guaranty, a guaranty is a contract and, as with any contract, a party seeking
enforcement must have acted in good faith .... the bank knew or should have
known that [guarantor] had no reason to guarantee new ... loans. With this
knowledge, fairness dictated that the bank at least give [guarantor] some notice or
warning if it expected to hold him liable for new ... loans.

ld. at * 1.
Such is the case here. Pursuant to the Bank's duty of good faith and fair dealing to the
Van Engelens, the Bank should have given the Van Engelens notice that they would be held
personally liable for the 2005 Loans, particularly where the Bank had ample evidence that the
Van Engelens were unaware of this fact and proceeding only because they had been assured by
the Bank that there was no personal guarantee. (Craig Depo. p. 31 :24-33:9; Kristen Depo. p.
25:23-27:8 and 28:14-23; Craig AfT. at,; 12-20; Kristen AfT. at ~ 12-19.) The Bank's
misrepresentations and silence violates and significantly impairs the contract, because it
prevented the Van Engelens from the opportunity to exercise their contractual right to terminate
the continuing Guarantee prior to causing VED to entered into the loan agreement. (Craig AfT. at
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20; Kristen Aff. at ~ 19.) As the Bank has violated its own duties of good faith and fair dealing,

it cannot now enforce the Guarantee against the Van Engelens.

E.

There is a Genuine Issue of Material Fact as to Whether the Bank's Actions
Fraudulently Induced the Van Engelens to Cause VED to Enter the
Transactions

The elements of fraudulent inducement are: (1) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its
materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth; (5) his intent that
it should be acted on by the person and in the manner reasonably contemplated; (6) the hearer's
ignorance of its falsity; (7).his reliance on the truth; (8) his right to rely thereon; and (9) his
consequent and proximate injury.7 Aspiazu v. lvfortimer, 139 Idaho 548, 550, 82 P.3d 830,832
(2003). A described in extensive detail in the sections above, the Bank knowingly made a false
misrepresentation to the Van Engelens that no personal guarantee would be required or apply to
the 2005 Loans. (Churchill Depo. 36:23-25; Craig Depo. p. 31:24-33:9; Kristen Depo. p. 25:2327:8 and 28:14-23; Craig Aff at ~ 13-22; Kristen AfT. at ~ 12-20.) These misrepresentations
were made for the purpose of inducing the Van Engelens to cause their company to sign the loan
documents, and the Van Engelens did so rely to their detriment. (Craig. Aff. at ~ 17-20; Kristen
Aff at ~ 16-19.) As described in Section C above, the Bank had a duty to correct these
misrepresentations of fact; as such, the Van Engelens had a right to reply upon such statements.
Under these circumstances, genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment.

F.

There is a Genuine Issue of Material Fact as to Whether the Continuing
Guarantee was Intended to Extend to the 2005 Loans

Because the Guarantee was not referenced in any of the documents related to the 2005
Loans, (Churchill Depo. p. 30:12-34:14 and 36:4-22; Henson Depo. p. 20:11-3; Craig Aff. at ~

7 It is unclear whether an injury must be alleged when fraudulent inducement is advanced as an
affinnative defense, rather than a claim or counterclaim. Regardless, the Van Engelens were
damaged by causing VED to sign the loan documents.
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13; Kristen AfT. at ~ 12,) there is a genuine and material issue of fact as to whether the parties
intended the Guarantee to extend to the 2005 Loans. The New York case Cadle Co. v.
Newhouse, 300 A.D.2d 756 (N.Y.A.D. 2002), is squarely on point. In that case, the guarantor
guaranteed a $50,000 loan in 1989. The guarantee was a continuing guarantee for the borrower's
liabilities to the lender "now or hereafter existing." The initial $50,000 loan was paid in full. In
1991, the borrower negotiated a second $2 million loan trom the lender's successor. The
borrower defaulted on that loan, and the lender sought payment from the guarantor under the
1989 continuing guarantee. The court held that there was a genuine and material issue of fact as
to whether the 1989 continuing guarantee \vas intended to apply to the second loan when "[ nJot
one document in the record from [the lender] expressly links the 1989 guaranty to the 1991
loan." Id. Here, no loan documents relative to the 2005 Loans link the Guarantee to that loan.
(Churchill Depo. p. 30:12-34:14 and 36:4-22; Henson Depo. p. 20:11-3;Craig Aff. at ~ 13;
Kristen AfT. at ~ 12.) Further, the Bank expressly stated on two occasions that the 2005 Loans
was not secured by a personal guarantee. (Craig Depo. p. 31 :24-33:9; Kristen Depo. p. 25:2327:8 and 28:14-23; Craig Aff. at ~ 13-22; Kristen Aff. at ~ 12-20.) At the very least, this raises a
genuine and material issue of fact as to whether the Guarantee was intended to apply to the 2005
Loans.

G.

There is a Genuine Issue of Material Fact as to Whether there are No
Damages, Unjust Enrichment, Failure to Mitigate, and Double Recovery

Assuming that the Guarantee is ultimately found to be enforceable against the Van
Engelens, genuine issues of material fact exist on whether the Bank has actually suffered any
damages or has failed to mitigated its damages. The Bank seeks the deficiency of $4,452,809.67
from the Van Engelens based on the alleged continuing Guarantee. While the bank has sold
some of the houses on the foreclosed property, (Churchill Depo. p. 72:5-23), the Bank has not
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 17
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constructed additional homes on the lots, (Churchill Depo. p. 72:24-73:3), and is simply holding
the property in anticipation of further profits from the sale or development of the property in the
future. (Churchill Depo. p. 76:1-19) As a representative of the Bank has acknowledged, it may
be possible for the Bank to recoup its losses by selling the property for more than the value it bid
at the foreclosure sale. (Sullivan Depo. 76:25-77:15.) In fact, any sale of the property mitigates
the Bank's damages.
The Van Engelens are not attempting to invoke the protection ofIdaho's anti-deficiency
statute, Idaho Code § 45-1512, which is inapplicable to guarantors. First Security Bank of Idaho
v. Gaige, 115 Idaho 172, 174, 765 P.2d 683, 685 (1988). Rather, these affirmative defenses are
directed at whether the Bank would inappropriately receive a windfall by collecting against the
Van Engelens and still holding the valuable property. A party has an obligation to take such
steps as would reasonably tend to minimize damages occasioned by breach of contract. Casey v.
Nampa and lHeridian Irr. Dist., 85 Idaho 299,305,379 P.2d 409,412 (1963). As the Idaho

Supreme Court has said, "a plaintiff who is injured by actionable conduct of a defendant is
ordinarily denied recovery for damages which could have been avoided by reasonable acts,
including reasonable expenditures, after actionable conduct has taken place." Nfargaret H
Wayne Trust v. Lipsky. 123 Idaho 253, 261,846 P.2d 904, 912 (1993). Moreover, as a personal

guarantee is an agreement to pay the amount due if the borrower fails to pay, it is highly
analogous to a liquidated damages clause wherein the parties agree in advance to the amount of
damages in case of a breach. Such damages must, of course, bear a reasonable relationship to
actual damages. See Graves v. Cupic. 75 Idaho 451, 456, 272 P.2d 1020, 1023 (1954). Under
these circumstances, summary judgment is precluded because genuine issues of material fact
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exist on whether the Bank has actually suffered any damages or has failed to mitigated its
damages.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, and as demonstrated by the affidavits, evidence, and
depositions in this case, many genuine issues of material fact exist which, if proven, prevent the
Bank from enforcing the Guarantee. As such, the Van Engelens respectfully ask that the Court
deny the Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment.
DATED this 14th day of October, 2010.

I

_~=---~~/~/_·----------------------
Dara LabrunV
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
Attorneys for the Defendants
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Attorneys for Plaintiff, Washington Federal Savings

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS,
a United States Corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
H. CRAIG VAN ENGELEN and KRISTEN
L. VAN ENGELEN,
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV OC 0917209

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT
OF BRYAN CHURCHILL IN
SUPPORT OF SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

)
) ss.
)

Bryan Churchill being first duly sworn, upon oath deposes and says:
1.

I am an Assistant Vice President and authorized representative of Washington Federal

Savings, a United States Corporation, ("Washington Federal"), the named Plaintiff in the abovecaptioned action.

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF BRYAN CHURCHILL IN SUPPORT OF
SUMMARY JUDGMENT-PAGE 1
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2.

That, the statements made herein are based upon my personal knowledge, and the

files and records created and maintained by Washington Federal Savings in the normal course of its
lending activities.
3.

Attached as Exhibit A hereto, is a true and correct copy of the "Adjustable Rate

Straight Note" dated February 22, 2005 and executed by H. Craig and Kristen Van Engelen for an
extension of credit to Northwest Development Company, LLC for the project referred to as Carriage
Hill, Phase 3.
4.

Attached as Exhibit B hereto, is a true and correct copy of the "Short Form Deed of

Trust" dated February 22, 2005 and executed by H. Craig and Kristen Van Engelen on February 24,
2005, securing the extension of credit to Northwest Development Company, LLC for the project
referred to as Carriage Hill, Phase 3.
5.

Attached as Exhibit C hereto, is a true and correct copy of the "Adjustable Rate

Straight Note" dated February 22, 2005 and executed by H. Craig and Kristen Van Engelen for an
extension of credit to Northwest Development Company, LLC for the project referred to as Carriage
Hill, Phase 4.
6.

Attached as Exhibit D hereto, is a true and correct copy of the "Short Form Deed of

Trust" dated February 22,2005 and executed by H. Craig and Kristen Van Engelen on February 24,
2005, securing the extension of credit to Northwest Development Company, LLC for the project
referred to as Carriage Hill, Phase 4.
7.

That the closings for the above-referenced loans were conducted in February, 2005

and are separate and distinct transactions from the 2006 and 2007 loans for which Washington

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF BRYAN CHURCHILL IN SUPPORT OF

SUMMARY JUDGMENT-PAGE 2
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Federal seeks relief under its Complaint on file with the Court.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this /~ day of October, 2010.

Residing at .....J...:;~~~'----".:rr-::~-
My commission eXpIres: -':"'f-=-:..~::...::...!--""--
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document entitled
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF BRYAN CHURCHILL IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, was served this 1- / day of October, 2010, on the following by:
Thomas Banducci
Wade Woodard
DaraLabrum
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

_y.S.Mail
/ 'Hand Delivered
_ Overnight Mail
_ Facsimile No. (208) 342-4455

802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83702

oe0~-

~

David E. Wishney
Chad E. Bernards
Attorney for Washington Federal Savings
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ABLE RATE
STRAIGHT NOTE

Boise

$1,79C,000.OO
(Amount}

ICity}

Idaho

Loan No.

February 22nd, 2005
IDatel

(State)

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned ("Borrower") promise(s) to pay to the order of WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS,
1001 W Idaho St, Boise, Idaho 83702
("Lender"), the principal sum of
Ol'lo'E MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY THOUSAND AND NO/looS
( $1,790,000.00
) Dollars, with interest on the principal from this date at the rate of ~SE!!:...VE~N~_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _-:-_ __
per cent (7.000 %) per annum until June 1st, 2005
. The interest rate shall then be adjusted for the next
three months to an interest rate equivalent to the Prime Rate ("Prime Rate" shall mean the published rate quoted on the day prior to
adjustment obtained from the "Money Rates" Listing of the Western Edition of the Wall Street Journal) plus _ _ _ _ _ _ __
ONE AND ONE HALF
per cent (1.500
%). Afterwards, the interest rate will be adjusted in the same
manner every three months until this Note is paid in full; provided, however, that the interest rate on this Note shall never be lower
per cent (5.500
%). Interest on this Note will accrue each month and be
than FIVE Al'<'D ONE HALF
due on the first of the following month. All amounts owing on this obligation are payable in full on or before Fehruary 22nd, 2007
If Lender has not received the full amount of any payment by the end of 15 calendar days after the date it is due. Borrower will pay
a late charge to Lender. The amount of the charge will be 5 % of the overdue payment of principal and interest. Borrower agrees to pay
the late charge promptly but only once on each late payment.
If the Lender seeks the services of an Attorney (whether Lender's employee or outside counsel) to enforce any provisions of this
Note, the Deed of Trust, the Construction Loan Agreement or Land Loan Agreement (if any), or other promises of the Borrower as
contained in the loan documents, the Lender shall be entitled to all of its attorney's fees and costs of enforoernent, and the Lender shall
have the right to add these fees and costs to the principal balance of the loan as they accrue.
All persons liable either now or in the future for the payment of this Note each waive presentment, demand, and notice of
non-payment of this Note, and agree that any modification of the terms of payment made at the request of any person liable on this Note
shall in no way impair their liability on this Note.
Borrower consents that in any suit or action brought for the foreclosure of the Deed of Trust securing this Note, a deficiency
judgment may be taken for any balance of debt remaining after the application of the proceeds of the mortgaged property; and also
consents that, upon the default of the Borrower the holder of this Note or a receiver who is appointed by the court, may take possession
of the mortgaged premises and collect the rents pending judicial or non-judicial foreclosure of the Deed of Trust and apply the net
rentals upon this Note.
In any action or proceeding to recover any sum provided for in this Note, no defense of (I) adequacy of security or (2) that resort
must first be had to security or to any other person, shall be asserted. All of the covenants, provisions and conditions contained in this
Note are made on behalf of, and shall apply to and bind the respective distributees. personal representatives, successors and assigns of
the Borrower, jointly and severally. Each and every party signing or endorsing this Note is bound as a principal and not as surety,
guarantor or in any other capacity.

This Note is secured by a Deed of Trust of even date covering real property located in CANYON
County,
Idaho
, and reference is made in the Deed of Trust for rights as to prepayment or acceleration which may be in addition to
those provided in this Note.
This Note is made with reference to and is to be construed in accordance with the laws of the State of ...;I.;.;dah.;.;;;;.;.o'--_ _ _ _ , and all
applicable laws and regUlations of the United States of America.

PAID

~

Date
WASHIM ON FEDERAL
SAVINGS AND LOAN

NORTHWEST DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LLC

KRISTEN L VAN ENGELEN - MEMBER
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Loan Number ,. 024 207 299897-9
Title cilmpany , ',)
Order NUmber OS00027702

AFTER RECORDING RETURN TO:
Washington Federal Savings
Boise-Main Office

-.J

~

PO Box 1460
Boise ID 83701
Attention: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

SHORT FORM DEED OF TRUST

THIS DEED OF TRUST ("Security Instrument") is made _ _ _ _-'F,..,e""bruary:..=:!."-'2:::2""n.::;d,c..:2""'OO""S"--_ _ _ _ _ _ BETWEEN
NORTHWEST DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LLC
as Grantor
("Borrower"), whose address is
6126 W STATE ST, BOISE ID 83703
and TRANSNATION TITLE & ESCROW, INC.
as Trustee,
whose address is
1750 FRONT STREET, STE 120, BOISE, ID 83702
and WASlDNGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, a United States Corporation, as Beneficiary ("Lender"), whose address is
1001 W Idaho St, Boise, Idaho 83702
Borrower hereby irrevocably grants, bargains, sells and conveys to Trustee in trust, with power of sale acoording to Idaho law, all
Borrower's estate, right, title, interest, claim and demand, now owned or hereafter acquired, in and to the following described
property in CANYON
County, Idaho (the "Property", which term shall include all or any part of the
Property, any improvements thereon and all the property described in Paragraph 2 of the Master Form Deed of Trust hereinafter
referred to):

AS PER ATTACHED EXHIBIT "A", AND BY THIS REFERENCE INCORPORATED HEREIN.

TOGETHER WITH all the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances, now or hereafter thereunto belonging or in any
way appertaining, leases and other agreements for the use and occupancy pertaining thereto, and the rents, issues and profits thereof
and all other propeny or rights of any kind or nature whatsoever further set forth in the Master Form Deed of Trust hereinafter
referred to, SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given to and conferred upon Lender to collect
and apply such rents, issues and profits.
This Security Instrument shall constitute a security agreement under the Uniform Corumercial Code of Idaho between
Borrower as debtor and Lender as secured party. Borrower grants a security interest to Lender in any of the Property which is
personal property and also grants a security interest in the property described in Paragraph 3 of the Master Form Deed of Trust
hereinafter referred to, now owned or hereafter acquired by Borrower (the Property, as defmed above, and the property described
in said Paragraph 3 are hereafter collectively referred to as the ·Collateral").
THIS SECURITY INSTRUMENT IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING the following:
(a) Payment of the sum of
ONE MILLION SEVEN HUND';::;;:RE-;::D:;::-:NINE~;::;TY==TH=O-;::U:;:::SA~ND:-::::--:A~ND:=-::N-::O:::"':/7100s=-----------=-D-=-O"""'LLA:-:-:R=S
( $1,790,000.00
), with interest thereon acoording to the terms of a promissory note of even date herewith, payable to
Lender or order and made by Borrower (the "Note", which term shall include all notes evidencing the indebtedness secured by this
Security Instrument, including all renewals, modifications or extensions thereof);

P A , D

Borrower's Initials

~
Date

0.1 '1 b
VI,il,SHli~ TON FEDE:AL
SAVINGS AND lO ••N
f>.SSOC'ATtON

k

c:!..t/~
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of any further sums advanced or loaned by
• or any of its successors or assigns. if (1) the
Note or other writing evidencing the future advance or loan specifically states that it is secured by this Security Instrument, or (2)
the advance. including costs and expenses incurred by Lender, is made pursuant to this Security Instrument or any other documents
executed by Borrower evidencing. securing, or relating to the Note and/or the Collateral. whether executed prior to,
contemporaneously with, or subsequent to this Security Instrument (this Security Instrument, the Note and such other documents,
including any construction loan, land loan or other loan agreement, are hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Loan
Documents"), together with interest thereon at the rate set forth in the Note unless otherwise specified in the Loan Documents or
agreed to in writing;
c) Performance of each agreement. term and condition set forth or incorporated by reference in the Loan Documents,
including without limitation the loan agreement of even date herewith, which are incorporated herein by reference or contained
herein.
THE MATURITY DATE OF THESE SECURED OBLIGATIONS, AS CONTAINED IN THE LOAN DOCUMENTS,
INCLUDING THE NOTE, IS February 22nd, 2007
By executing and delivering this Security Instrument and the Note secured hereby, the parties agree that all provisions of
Paragraphs 1 through 69 inclusive of the Master Form Deed of Trust hereinafter referred to, except such paragraphs as are
specifieally excluded or modified herein. are hereby incorporated herein by reference and made an integral part hereof for all
purposes the same as if set forth herein at length, and the Borrower hereby makes said covenants and agrees to fully perform all of
said provisions. The Master Form Deed of Trust above referred to was recorded on the dates below shown, in the Official Records
of the offices of the County Auditors or County Recorders of the following counties in the State of Idaho according to the
enumerated recordation designations appearing below after the name of each county, to wit:
BOOK, FILM
RECORDlNG, MICROFILM
DATE OF
COUNTY
OR VOLUME
PAGE NO.
OR INSTRUMENT NO.
RECORDING
ADA
95074504
October 11, 1995
ADAMS
88929
October 11, 1995
BANNOCK
649
95015022
October 11, 1995
BEAR LAKE
162607
October 11, 1995
BENEWAH
0202221
October 12. 1995
BINGHAM
438527
October 12. 1995
BLAINE
383121
October 11, 1995
BOISE
157897
October 11, 1995
BONNER
473936
October 11, 1995
BONNEVILLE
Fiche No. 10931-06 Instrument Code 265
907689
October 11. 1995
BOUNDARY
104
233
0179230
October 11, 1995
BUTTE
029526
October 13. 1995
CAMAS
5 (Misc.)
069524
561
October II, 1995
CANYON
9528569
October 11, 1995
CARmOU
[Recorded in Microfilm Records]
150908
October 11, 1995
CASSIA
270
239052
October 11. 1995
CLARK
45958
October 12, 1995
CLEARWATER
170279
October 11, 1995
CUSTER
0209792
October 13, 1995
ELMORE
289471
October 11. 1995
FRANKLIN
194480
October 12, 1995
FREMONT
438213
October 12, 1995
GEM
[Recorded as Misc. Record]
186890
October 12, 1995
GOODING
162966
October 11. 1995
IDAHO
382774
October 11, 1995
JEFFERSON
278273
October 11, 1995
JEROME
954138
October 11, 1995
KOOTENAI
1417404
October 11. 1995
LATAH
415681
October 12. 1995
LEMHI
227723
October 11, 1995
LEWIS
117811
October 11, 1995
UNCOLN
159951
October 11, 1995
MADISON
258276
258276
October 12, 1995
MINIKOKA
420581
October 11, 1995
NEZPERCE
602171
October 11, 1995
ONEIDA
122137
October 11, 1995
OWYEE
216934
October 11, 1995
PAYETTE
47 Mtgs.
257856
257856
October 11, 1995
POWER
8
164342
October 11, 1995
SHOSHONE
[Mortgages]
369368
October 11, 1995
TETON
121537
October 11. 1995
TWIN FALLS
[Misc. #2371]
1995015711
October 11, 1995
VALLEY
214163
October 12, 1995
WASHINGTON
[Mortgage/Misc.]
164467
October 11. 1995
A copy of such Master Form Deed of Trust has been furnished to the person executing this Security Instrument, and by
executing this Security Instrument the Borrower acknowledges having received such Master Form Deed of Trust.
The Property which is the subject of this Security Instrument is either not more than 20 acres in area or the Property is
located within an incorporated city or village.
The undersigned Borrower requests that a copy of any Notice of Default and of any Notice of Sale hereunder, as required
by Idaho law for the foreclosure of a deed of trust. be mailed to Borrower at Borrower's address as hereinabove set forth.

BOl'~ower .agrees to .obtain all insurance required from time to time by Lender and as elsewhere provided in the Loan
Documents, mcludmg flood msurance. If Borrower fails to maintain such insurance satisfactory to the Lender, Lender may make
the payment on behalf of the Borrower and any sums expended shall be added to principal and bear interest at the rate provided in
the Note.

(Page 2 qj 3)
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!f the box preceding any of the following statements

an ·X·, that statement is a part of this Security Instriirnetllt. If the box
is ~ so checked, the corresponding statement is !lQl part of this Security Ins~ent.

o
[XJ

o
o

Paragraph 49 of the Master Form Deed of Trust (which refers to the existence, if any, of an adjustable rate feature in the
Note) is hereby deleted.
The Note secured hereby evidences a construction loan or land loan but is not a combination Note. Paragraph 53 of the
Master Form Deed of Trust is hereby deleted.
The Note secured hereby is a combination construction loan/permanent loan Note. Refer to paragraph 53 of the Master
Form Deed of Trust.

The Propeny or a part thereof is a Condominium. Refer to paragraph 50 of the Master Form Deed of Trust.

o

A fee owner and a leasehold owner of the Property, or a ponion thereof, have executed this Security Instrument. Refer to

o

The Property or a part thereof is a leasehold estate. Refer to paragraph 52 of the Master Form Deed of Trust.

o

See also Schedule' A» of this Short Form Deed of Trust, attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference.

paragraph 51 of the Master Form Deed of Trust

WITNESS the hand(s) and seales) of the Borrower, and each of them if more than one, on the day and year first above written.

NORTHWEST DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LLC

H CRAIG VAN ENGELEN . MEMBER

/

L~~

KRISTEN L VAN ENGELEN . MEMBER

STATE OF

Ie

COUNTY OF
(l$jl
)
I certify that I know or have satisfactory evide
[Nam
f person(s)]
is/are the person(s) who appeared before me, and said person(s
knowledged that (he/she/they) signed this instrument and
!!fPOses mentioned in the instrument.
acknowledged it to be (his/her/their) free and voluntary act for the uses
Dated: ______________
(Seal or Stsrnp)

residingat ____________~~-------------My commission expires _ _ _--"""<::-_ _ _ _ __

ame(s) of person(s)]
is/are the person(s) who appeared before me, and sald person(s) acknowledged that (he/she/they) signed this instrument, on oath
stated that (helshe/they) was/were aithorized to execute the instrument and acknowledged it as the
IH f' nl~{ (J
"

(Seal or Stamp)

Notary Public in and~in_:ldafklall'too-------residing at
!Ay('.ommissim .... IM2.21110
My commission expires ______________

05049 1027 1669
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0500027702

EXHIBIT "A"
CARR:tAGE BILL SUBDIVISION NO. 3a
A parcel of land located in the Southeast quarter of Section 31, Township 3 North, Range 2

West, Boise Meridian, canyon County, Idaho, more particularly described as follows:
Commencing at the quarter corner common to Section 32 and the said Section 31, from which
the Southeast corner of said Section 31 bears
South 00°22'13" East, 2582.70 feet; thence
along the East-West mid-section line
South 89°16'20" West, 525.81 feet to the REAL POINT OF BEGINNING; thence
South 00°43'40" East, 220.00 feet; thence
South 89°16'20" West, 12.46 feet; thence
South 00°22'47" West, 93.34 feet; thence
North 89°37'13" West, 100.00 feet; thence
South 79°06'59" West, 50.98 feet; thence
South 82°39'31" West, 75.10 feet; thence
South 67°21'43" West, 90.17 feet; thence
South 67 0 30'47" West, 70.21 feet; thence
South 50°47'56" West, 84.32 feet; thence
South 55°45'40· East, 137.75 feet; thence
South 19°17'29" East, 96.69 feet; thence
South 71 0 02'56" West, 98·69 feet; thence
36.00 feet along the arc of a non-tangent curve to the right, having a radius of 85.00
feet, a central angle of 24°16'11" and a long chord bearing South 11°12'32" West, 35.74
feet i thence
16.69 feet along the arc of a curve to the left, having a radius of 20.00 feet, a central
angle of 47°49'18" and a long chord bearing South 00°34'01" East, 16.21 feet; thence
26.53 feet along the arc of a curve to the right, having a radius of 275.00 feet, a
central angle of 5°31'36" and a long chord bearing South 21°42'52" East, 26.52 feet;
thence
South 71°02'56" West, 50.00 feet; thence
19.97 feet along the arc of a non-tangent curve to the left, having a radius of 225.00
feet, a central angle of 5°05'05" and a long chord bearing North 21°29'37" West, 19.96
feet; thence
South 65°57'51" West, 100.00 feet; thence
North 35°27'57" West, 68.23 feet; thence
North 67 0 58'28" West, 80.00 feet; thence
North 17°58'38" East, 100.53 feet; thence
South 73°04'48" West, 30.29 feet; thence
South 32°18'45" West, 95.80 feet; thence
North 57°41'15" West, 50.00 feet; thence
North 32 0 18'45" East, 20.00 feet; thence
North 61°24'07 n West, 112.75 feet to an angle point on the Easterly boundary of carriage
Hill Subdivision No. I, as same is recorded in Book 26 of Plats at Page 29, records of
Canyon County, Idaho; thence
along the Easterly boundary of said subdiviSion
North 38 0 31'58" East, 100.11 feet; thence
North 54 0 11'38" West. 100.61 feet; thence
(Continued)
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File No.:

0500027702
SCHEDULE A (continued)

LEGAL DESCRXPTXON (continued)

North 14°44'17" Eastl 146.36 feet; thence
North 4°34'33" East, 50.00 feet; thence
North 85°25'27" West, 67.36 feet; thence
North 1°28'46" East, 228,07 feet to the Northeast corner of said subdivision lying on the
East-West mid-section line; thence
along said line
North 89°16'20" East, 871.51 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING.
CARRIAGE HILL SUBDIVISION NO. 3b

A parcel of land located in the Southeast quarter of Section 31, Township 3 North, Range 2
West, Boise Meridian, Canyon County, Idaho, more particularly described as follows:
CommenCing at the quarter corner common to Section 32 and the said Section 31, from which
the Southeast corner of said Section 31 bears
South 00°22'13" East, 2582.70 feet; thence
along the East-West mid-section line
South 89°16'20" West, 1397.32 feet; thence
South 3°59'46" East, 563.30 feet to the Southwest corner of Lot 3, Block 3 of Carriage
Hill SUbdivision No. 3a, as same is recorded in Book
of Plats at Page ___ , records of
Canyon County, Idaho, said point being the REAL POINT OF BEGINNING; thence
along the Southerly border of said subdivision
South 61°24'07" East, 112.75 feet; thence
South 32°18'45" West, 20.00 feet; thence
South 57°41'15" East, 50.00 feet; thence
North 32°18'45" East, 95.80 feet; thence
North 73°04'48" East, 30.29 feet; thence
South 17 D 58'38" West, 100.53 feet; thence
South 67°58'28" East, 80.00 feet; thence
South 35°27'57" East, 68.23 feet; thence
North 65°57'51" East, 100.00 feet; thence
19,97 feet along the arc of a non-tangent curve to the right, having a radius of 225.00
feet, a central angle of 5°05'05" and a long chord bearing South 21°29'37" East, 19.96
feet i thence
North 71°02'56" East, 50.00 feet; thence
26.53 feet along the arc of a non-tangent curve to the left, having a radius of 275.00
feet, a central angle of 5°31'36" and a long chord bearing North 21°42'52" West, 26.52
feet; thence
16.69 feet along the arc of a curve to the right, having a radius of 20.00 feet, a central
angle of 47 0 49'18" and a long chord bearing North 00D34'01" West, 16 21 feet; thence
36.00 feet along the arc of a curve to the left, having a radius of 85.00 feet, a central
angle of 24°16'11" and a long chord bearing North 11°12'32" East, 35.74 feet; thence
North 71°02'56" East, 98.69 feet; thence
departing said Southerly boundary of Carriage Hill Subdivision No. 3
South 19°17'29" East, 315,17 feet; thence
South 2°16'14" East, 200.76 feet; thence
North 88°52'57" East, 72.20 feet; thence
46.17 feet along the arc of a curve to the left, having a radius of 275.00 feet, a central
angle of 9°37'10" and a long chord bearing North 84°04'22" East, 46.12 feet; thence
(Continued)
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0500027702
SCHEDULE A (continued)

LEGAL DESCRIPTZON (continued)
South 10°44'13 8 East, 50.00 feet; thence
South 29°32'36" East, 141.65 feet; thence
South 1°07'03" East, IS.00 feet to a point on the South line of the North half of the
Southwest quarter; thence
along said line
South 88°52'57" West, 696.37 feet to the Southeast corner of carriage Hill Subdivision No.
of Plats at Page __ , records of Canyon County, Idaho;
2, as same is recorded in Book
thence
along the Easterly boundary of said subdivision and the Easterly boundary of Carriage Hill
Subdivision No.1, as same is recorded in Book 26 of Plats at Page 29, records of canyon
County, Idaho,
North 30°50'44- West, 246.17 feet; thence
North 21°38'55· West, 298.67 feet; thence
North 9 0 10'01" West, 78.29 feet; then~e
North 7°00'43" West, 94.64 feeti thence
34.45 feet along the arc of a curve to the left, having a radius of 172.00 feet, a central
angle of 11°28'39° and a long chord bearing North 12°45'03 n West, 34.40 feet; thence
North 71 0 30'38" East, 131.75 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING.
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ABLE RATE
STRAIGHT NOTE

$346,320.00

Boise

Loan No. _0;:;:2:..:4..;;2:..;:0..:,.7-=-.:....:-:c::.-;_ _ __

Idaho

February 22nd, 2005

lSlated

lDiltel

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned ("Borrower") promisees) to pay to the order of W ASIllNGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS,
1001 W Idaho St, Boise, Idaho 83702
("Lender"), the principal sum of
THREE HlJNDRED FORTY SIX THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED TWENTY AND NOtlOOS
($346,320.00
) Dollars, with interest on the principal from this date at the rate of -'S:.:E=.V.:..E=-N:...-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
. The interest rate shall then be adjusted for the next
per cent (7.000 %) per annum until June 1st, 2005
three months to an interest rate equivalent to the Prime Rate ("Prime Rate" shall mean the published rate quoted on the day prior to
adjustment obtained from the "Money Rates" Listing of the Western Edition of the Wall Street Journal) plus _-::-_~_ _ __
ONE AND ONE HALf
per cent (1.500
%). Afterwards, the interest rate will be adjusted in the same
manner every three months until this Note is paid in full; provided, however, that the interest rate on this Note shall never be lower
than FIVE A!IID ONE HALF
per cent (5.500
%). Interest on this Note will accrue each month and be
due on the first of the following month. All amounts owing on this obligation are payable in full on or before February 22nd, 2007
If Lender has not received the full amount of any payment by the end of 15 calendar days after the date it is due, Borrower will pay
a late charge to Lender. The amount of the charge will be 5 % of the overdue payment of principal and interest. Borrower agrees to pay
the late charge promptly but only once on each late payment.

I

If the Lender seeks the services of an Attorney (whether Lender's employee or outside counsel) to enforce any provisions of this
Note, the Deed of Trust, the Construction Loan Agreement or Land Loan Agreement (if any), or other promises of the Borrower as
contained in the loan documents, the Lender shall be entitled to all of its attorney's fees and costs of enforcement, and the Lender shall
have the right to add these fees and costs to the principal balance of the loan as they accrue.
All persons liable either now or in the future for the payment of this Note each waive presentment, demand, and notice of
non-payment of this Note, and agree that any modification of the terms of payment made at the request of any person liable on this Note
shall in no way impair their liability on this Note.
Borrower consents that in any suit or action brought for the foreclosure of the Deed of Trust securing this Note, a deficiency
judgment may be taken for any balance of debt remaining after the application of the proceeds of the mortgaged property; and also
consents that, upon the default of the Borrower the holder of this Note or a receiver who is appointed by the court, may take possession
of the mortgaged premises and collect the rents pending judicial or non-judicial foreclosure of the Deed of Trust and apply the net
rentals upon this Note.
In any action or proceeding to recover any sum provided for in this Note, no defense of (1) adequacy of security or (2) that resort
must first be had to security or to any other person, shall be asserted. All of the covenants, provisions and conditions contained in this
Note are made on behalf of, and shall apply to and bind the respective distributees, personal representatives, successors and assigns of
the Borrower, jointly and severally. Each and every party signing or endorsing this Note is bound as a principal and not as surety,
guarantor or in any other capacity.
This Note is secured by a Deed of Trust of even date covering real property located in CANYON
County,
Idaho
, and reference is made in the Deed of Trust for rights as to prepayment or acceleration which may be in addition to
those provided in this Note.
This Note is made with reference to and is to be construed in accordance with the laws of the State of .:::.I.;;;.da:;:;hc.;o'-_ _ _ _ , and all
applicable laws and regulations of the United States of;America.

NORTHWEST DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LLC

H CRAIG VAN ENGELEN . MEMBER

KRlSTEN L VAN ENGELENI. MEMBER

I
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Loari-'Number 024 207 299902-7
Title Company
Order Number 0500027702

AFTER RECORDING RETURN TO:
Washington Federal Savings
Boise-lVlain Office
PO Box 1460
Boise ID 83701
Attention: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

-

SHORT FORM DEED OF TRUST

THIS DEED OF TRUST ("Security Instrument") is made _ _ _ _ _~F::::eb::!r.!:u~a!..rv~22::!n~d~,..!2"'00=5_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ BETWEEN
NORTHWEST DEVELOPMENT COMPAi\'Y, LLC
as
("Borrower"), whose address is
6126 W STATE ST, BOISE ID 83703
and TRANSNATION TITLE & ESCROW, INC.
as Trustee,
whose address is
1750 FRONT STREET, STE 120, BOISE, ID/83702
and W ASHL'IIGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, a United States Corporation, as Beneficiary ("Lender"), whose address is
1001 W Idaho St, Boise, Idaho 83702
Borrower hereby irrevocably grants, bargains, sells and conveys to Trustee in trust, with power of sale according to Idaho law, all
Borrower's estate, right, title, interest, claim and demand, now owned or hereafter acquired, in and to the following described
property in CANYON
County, Idaho (the "Property", which term shall include all or any part of the
Properry, any improvements thereon and all the property described in Paragraph 2 of the Master Form Deed of Trust hereinafter
referred to):

AS PER ATIACHED EXHIBIT nAn, AND BY TillS REFERENCE INCORPORATED HE

TOGETHER WITH all the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances, now or hereafter thereunto belonging or in any
way appertaining, leases and other agreements for the use and occupancy pertaining thereto, and the rents, issues and profits thereof
and all other property or rights of any kind or nature whatsoever further set forth in the Master Form Deed of Trust hereinafter
referred to, SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given to and conferred upon Lender to collect
and apply such rents, issues and profits.
This Security Instrument shall constitute a security agreement under the Uniform Commercial Code of Idal10 between
Borrower as debtor and Lender as secured party. Borrower grants a security interest to Lender in any of the Property which is
personal property and also grants a security interest in the property described in Paragraph 3 of the Master Form Deed of Trust
hereinafter referred to, now owned or hereafter acquired by Borrower (the Property, as defined above, and the property described
in said Paragraph 3 are hereafter collectively referred to as the "Collateral").
THIS SECURITY INSTRUMENT IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING the following:
(a) Payment of the sum of
THREE ffiJNDRED FORTY S-I---X-T-H-O-U-SA-ND=---T-HRE--E-HUND--RE-D-T-WE-N-T-Y-A-ND-N-O-/l-oo-S------D-O-L-L-A-R-S
$346.320.00
), with interest thereon according to the terms of a promissory note of even date herewith, payable to
Lender or order and made by Borrower (the "Note", which term shall include all notes evidencing the indebtedness secured by this
Security Instrument, including all renewals, modifications or extensions thereof);

i .
Borrower's Initials'

L-
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b) Payment of any further sums advanced or loaned by Lender to Borrower, or any of its successors or assigns, if (I) the
Note or other writing evidencing the future advance or loan specifically states that it is secured by this Security Instrument, or (2)
the advance, including costs and expenses incurred by Lender, is m/<Ie pursuant to this Security Instrument or any other documents
executed by Borrower evidencing, securing, or relating to the Note and/or the Collateral, whether executed prior to,
contemporaneously with, or subsequent to this Security Instrument (this Security Instrument, the Note and such other documents,
including any construction loan, land loan or other loan agreement, are hereinafter collectively rererred to as the "Loan
Documents"), together with interest thereon at the rate set forth in the Note unless otherwise specified in the Loan Documents or
agreed to in writing;
c) Performance of each agreement, term and condition set forth or incorporated by reference in the Loan Documents,
including without limitation the loan agreement of even date herewith, which are incorporated herein by reference or contained
herein.
THE MATURITY DATE OF THESE SECURED OBLIGATIONS, AS CONTAINED IN THE LOAN DOCUMENTS,
INCLUDING THE NOTE, IS Fehruary 22nd. 2007
By executing and delivering this Security Instrument and the Note secured hereby, the parties agree that all provisions of
Paragraphs I through 69 inclusive of the Master Form Deed of Trust hereinafter referred to, except such paragraphs as are
specifically excluded or modified herein, are hereby incorporated herein by reference and made an integral part hereof for all
purposes the same as if set forth herein at length, and the Borrower hereby makes said covenants and agrees to fully perform all of
said provisions. The Master Form Deed of Trust above referred to was recorded on the dates below shown, in the Official Records
of the offices of the County Auditors or County Recorders of the following counties in the State of Idaho according to the
enumerated recordation designations appearing below after the name of each county. to wit:
DATE OF
BOOK, FILM
RECORDING, MICROFILM
COUNTY
OR VOLUME
PAGE NO.
OR INSTRUMENT NO.
RECORDING
ADA
95074504
October II, 1995
ADAMS
88929
October I J, 1995
BANNOCK
95015022
649
October II, 1995
BEAR LAKE
162607
October 11, 1995
BENEWAH
0202221
October 12, 1995
BINGHAM
438527
October 12, 1995
BLAINE
October 11, 1995
383121
BOISE
157897
October 11, 1995
BONNER
473936
October II, 1995
BONNEVILLE
Fiche No. 10931-06 Instrument Code 265
907689
October 11, 1995
BOUNDARY
233
104
0179230
October 11, 1995
BUTTE
029526
October 13, 1995
CAMAS
5 (Misc.)
561
069524
October 11, 1995
CANYON
9528569
October 11, 1995
CARIBOU
[Recorded in Microfilm Records]
150908
October 11. 1995
CASSIA
270
October 11, 1995
239052
CLARK
October 12, 1995
45958
CLEARWATER
October 11, 1995
170279
CUSTER
0209792
October 13, 1995
ELMORE
289471
October 11, 1995
FRANKLIN
194480
October 12. 1995
FREMONT
438213
October 12, 1995
GEM
[Recorded as Misc. Record]
186890
October 12, 1995
GOODING
October 11, 1995
162966
IDAHO
382774
October 11, 1995
JEFFERSON
278273
October II, 1995
JEROME
954138
October 11. 1995
KOOTENAI
October 11, 1995
1417404
LATAH
415681
October 12, 1995
LEMHI
October II, 1995
227723
LEWIS
October 11, 1995
117811
LINCOLN
October 11, 1995
159951
MADISON
258276
October 12, 1995
258276
MINIKOKA
420581
October 11, 1995
NEZPERCE
602171
October 11, 1995
ONEIDA
122137
October 11, 1995
OWYEE
October 11, 1995
216934
PAYETTE
47 Mtgs.
257856
October 11, 1995
257856
POWER
8
October II, 1995
164342
SHOSHONE
[Mortgages]
October I 1, 1995
369368
TETON
October 11, 1995
121537
TWIN FALLS
[Misc. #2371]
1995015711
October 11, 1995
VALLEY
214163
October 12, 1995
WASHINGTON
[Mortgage/Misc.]
164467
October 11, 1995

/

A copy of such Master Form Deed of Trust has been furnished to the person executing this Security Instrument, and by
executing this Security Instrument the Borrower acknowledges having received such Master Form Deed of Trust.
The Property which is the subject of this Security Instrument is either not more than 20 acres in area or the Property is
located within an incorporated city or village.
The undersigned Borrower requests that a copy of any Notice of Default and of any Notice of Sale hereunder, as required
by Idaho law for the foreclosure of a deed of trust, be mailed to Borrower at Borrower's address as hereinabove set forth.
Borrower agrees to obtain all insurance required from time to time by Lender and as elsewhere provided in the Loan
Documents, including flood insurance. If Borrower fads to maintain such insurance satisfactory to the Lcnder, Lender may make
the payment on behalf of the Borrower and any sums expended shall be added to principal and bear interest at the rale provided in
the Note.
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If the box preceding any of the following statements contains an "X", that statement is a part of this Security Instrument. If the box
is !lQ!. so checked, the corresponding statement is not part of this Security Instrument.

o
[]]

Paragraph 49 of the Master Form Deed of Trust (which refers to the existence, if any, of an adjustable rate feature in the
Note) is hereby deJeted.

The Note secured hereby evidences a construction loan or land loan but is not a combination Note. Paragraph 53 of the
Master Form Deed of Trust is hereby deleted.
The Note secured hereby is a combination construction loan/permanent loan Note. Refer to paragraph 53 of the Master
Form Deed of Trust.

o

The Property or a part thereof is a Condominium. Refer to paragraph 50 of the Master Form Deed of Trust.
A fee owner and a leasehold owner of the Property, or a portion thereof, have executed this Security Instrument. Refer to
paragraph 51 of the Master Form Deed of Trust

o
o

The Property or a part thereof is a leasehold estate. Refer to paragraph 52 of the Master Form Deed of Trust.
See also Schedule" A" of this Short Form Deed of Trust, attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference.

WITNESS the hand(s) and seales) of the Borrower, and each of them if more than one, on the day and year first above written.

NORTHWEST DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LLC

z<:---

~

H CRAIG V ZEN
N . LEN - MEMBER
/.'

</~-.;:

/.----.....-----

--- -"~

KRISTEN L·Y AN ENGELEN

MEMBER

STATE OF
COUNTY OF
I
that I know or have

) ss,
)
<ot;ef·,~",~,

is/are the person(s) who appeared before me, and said person(s) acknowledged that (he/she/they) signed this instrument and
acknowledged it to be (his/her/their) free and voluntary act for the uses and purposes mentioned in the instrument,
Dated: _ _ _ _ _ _ __
(Signature)
Notary Public in and for the State of _ _ _ _ _ __
residing at _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

(Seal or Starnp)

My commission expires _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

1,

STATE OF

,

JdL(hu
,1

COUNTY OF

!

!f..tltL

, [Narne(s) of person(s)]
is/are the person(s) who appeared before me, and said person(s) acknowledged that (he/she/they) signed this instrument, on oath
tv') t,,\rl !U ( ':'
stated that (he/she/they) waslwere authorized to execute the instrument and acknowledged it as the

(Seal or Stamp)

Notary Public in and for the State of _ _ _ _ _ __
residing at -------'RI'IiImIllill·IIIrlia.,ilM~_IIiI'IR*.,-a~lIMiI_---
My commission expires _.!l!_!IUo!I'cm!t!!oo!l!!!!_!!l!!.,.,..·""",-,11",·",t2",~=O,,-_
__
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File No.:

0500027702

SCHEDULE A (continued)
PHASE 4

Pc parcel of land located in the North half of the Southeast quarter of Section 31,

Township 3 North, Range 2 West, Boise Meridian, Canyon County, Idaho, more particularly
described as follows:
commencing at the quarter corner common to Section 32 and the said Section 31, from which
the Southeast corner of said Section 31 bears
South 00°22'13" East, 2582.70 feet; thence
a10ng the East-West mid-section line
South 89°16'20" West, 302.20 feet to the REAL POINT OF BEGINNING; thence
South 19°37'40" East, 96.90 feet; thence
South 40°24'03" East, 92.27 feet; thence
South 36°30'19" East, 118.29 feet; thence
South 00°54'00" East, 445.00 feet; thence
South 36°02'38" East, 234.96 feet to a point on the East boundary of said Section 31;
thence
a10ng said boundary
South 00°22'13" East, 395.95 feet to the South 1/16 corner common to said Sections 31 and
32; thence
a10ng the South boundary of the North half of the Southeast quarter
South 88°52'57" West, 1223.46 feet; thence
'----North 30°50'44" West, 246.17 feet; thence
North 21°38'55" West, 195.94 feet to the Southeast corner of Carriage Hill Subdivision No.
1, as same is recorded in Book 26 of Plats at Page 29, records of Canyon County, Idaho;
t.hence
along the Easterly boundary of said subdivision and continuing
North 21°38'55" West, 102.73 feet; thence
North 9 0 10'01" West, 78.29 feet; thence
North 7°00'43" West, 94.64 feet; thence
34.45 feet along the arc of a curve to the left, having a radius of 172.00 feet, a central
angle of llD28' 39" and a long chord bearing North 12°45' 03" West, 34.40 feet; thence
( Continued)

File No.:

0500027702
SCHEDULE A (continued)

LEGAL DESCRIPTION {continued}

North 71030' 38" East, 131.75 feet; thence
North 39°31'58" East, 100.11 feet; thence
North 54 Q 11'38" West, 100.61 feet; thence
North 14°44'17" East, 146.36 feet; thence
North 4°34'33" East, 50.00 feet; thence
North 85°25'27" West, 67.36 feet; thence
North 1028' 46" East, 228.07 feet to a point on the East-West mid-section line; thence
departing said Easterly boundary
North 89°16'20" East, 1095.11 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING·
EXCEPTING THEREFROM a parcel of land located in the Southeast quarter of Section 31,
Township 3 North, Range 2 West, Boise Meridian, Canyon County, Idaho, more particularly
described as follows:
Commencing at the quarter corner common to Section 32 and the said Section 31, from which
the Southeast corner of said Section 31 bears
South 00°22'13" East, 2582.70 feet; thence
along the East-West mid-section line
South 89°16'20" West, 525.81 feet to the REAL POINT OF BEGINNING; thence
South 00°43'40" East, 220,00 feet; thence
South 89°16'20" West, 12.46 feet; thence
South 00°22'47" West, 9334 feet; then~
North 89°37'13" West, 100.00 feet; thence
South 79°06'59" West, 50 98 feet; thence
South 82°39'31" West, 75.10 feet; thence
South 67°21'43" West, 90.17 feet; thence
South 67°30'47" West, 70.21 feet; thence
South 50°47'56" West, 84.32 feet; thence
South 55°45'40" East, 137.75 feet; thence
South 19°17'29" East, 96.69 feet; thence
South 71°02'56" West, 98.69 feet; thence
36.00 feet along the arc of a non-tangent curve to the right, having a raa~us of 85.00
feet, a central angle of 24°16'11" and a long chord bearing South 11°12'32" West, 35.74
feet; thence
16.69 feet along the arc of a curve to the left, having a radius of 20.00 feet, a central
angle of 47°49'18" and a long chord bearing South 00°34'01" East, 16.21 feeti thence
26.53 feet along the arc of a curve to the right, having a radius of 275.00 feet, a
central angle of 5°31'36" and a long chord bearing South 21°42'52" East, 26 52 feet;
thence
South 71002'56" West, 50.00 feet; thence
19.97 feet along the arc of a non-tangent curve to the left, having a radius of 225.00
feet, a central angle of 5°05'05" and a long chord bearing North 21°29'37" West, 19.96
feet; thence
South 65°57'51" West, 100.00 feet; thence
North 35°27'57" West, 6823 feet; thence
North 67°58'28" i'iest, 80.00 feet; thence
North 17°58'38" East, 100.53 feet; thence
South 73°04'48" West, 30.29 feet; thence
South 32°18'45" West, 95.80 feet; thence
North 57 D 41'15" West, 50.00 feet; thence
North 32°18'45" East, 20.00 feet; thence
(Continued)
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Pile No.:

0500027702
SCHEDULE A (continued)

LEGAL DESCRIPTION (continued)
North 61°24'07" West, 112.75 feet to an angle point on the Easterly boundary of Carriage
Subdivision No.1, as same is recorded in Book 26 of Plats at Page 29, records of
Canyon County, Idaho; thence
along the Easterly boundar.! of said subdivision
North 38°31'58" East, 100.11 feet; thence
North 54°11'38 u West, 100.61 feet; thence
North 14°44'17" East, 146.36 feet; thence
North 4°34'33" East, 50.00 feet; thence,
North 85°25'27u West, 67.36 feet; thence
North 1°28'46" East, 228.07 feet to the Northeast corner of said subdivision lying on the
East-West mid-section line; thence
along said line
North 89°16'20" East, 871.51 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING.

H~ll

ALSO EXCEPTING THEREFROM a parcel of land located in the Southeast quarter of Section 31,
Township 3 North, Range 2 West, Boise Meridian, Canyon County, Idaho, more particularly
described as follows:
Commencing at the quarter corner common to Section 32 and the said Section 31, from which
the Southeasc corner of said Section 31 bears
South 00°22'13" East, 2582.70 feet; thence
along the East-West mid-section ~e
South 89°16'20" West, 1397.32 feet; thence
South 3°59'46" East, 563,30 feet to the Southwest corner of Lot 3, Block 3 of Carriage
Hill Subdivision No" 3a, as same is recorded in Book
of Plats at Page __ , records of
Canyon County, Idaho, said point being the REAL POINT OF BEGINNING; thence
along the Southerly border of said subdivision
South 61°24'07" East, 112.75 feet; thence
South 32°18'45" West, 20.00 feet; thence
South 57°41'15/1 East, 50.00 feet; thence
North 32°18'45. East, 95.80 feet; thence
North 73°04'48. East, 30,29 feet; thence
South 17°58'38" West, 100.53 feet; thence
South 67°58'28" East, 80.00 feet; thence
South 35°27'57" East, 68.23 feet; thence
North 65°57'51 u East. 100.00 feet; thence
19.97 feet along the arc of a non-tangent curve to the right, having a radius of 225.00
feet, a central angle of 5°05'05" and a long chord bearing South 21°29'37" East, 19.96
feet; thence
North 71 0 02'56" East, 50.00 feet; thence
26.53 feet along the arc of a non-tangent curve to the left, having a radius of 275.00
feet, a central angle of 5°31'36" and a long chord bearing North 21°42'52" West, 26.52
feet; thence
16.69 feet along the arc of a curve to the right, having a radius of 20,00 feet, a central
angle of 47°49' 18" and a long chord bearing North 00 0 34'01" West , 16.21 feet, thence
36.00 feet along the arc of a curve to the left, having a radius of 85.00 feet, a central
angle of 24°16'11" and a long chord bearing North 11°12'32" East. 3574 feet; thence
North 71°02'56" East, 98.69 feeti thence
departing said Southerly boundary of Carriage Hill Subdivision No. 3
South 19°17'29" East, 315,17 feet; thence
South 2°16'14" East, 200.76 feet; thence
(Continued)
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File No.:

0500027702
SCHEDULE A (continued)

LEGAL DESCRIPTION (continued)
North 88°52'57" East, 72.20 feet; thence
46.17 feet along the arc of a curve to the left, having a radius of 275.00 feet, a central
angle of 9°37' 10" and a long chord bearing North 84°04' 22" East, 46.12 feet; thence
South 10°44'13" East, 50 00 feet; thence
South 29°32'36" East, 141.65 feet; thence
South 1°07'03" East, 15 00 feet to a point on the South line of the North half of the
Southwest quarter; thence
along said line

South 88°52'57" West, 696.37 feet to the Southeast corner of Carriage Hill Subdivision No.
2, as same is recorded in Book
of Plats at Page __ , records of Canyon County, Idaho;
thence
along the Easterly boundary of said subdivision and the Easterly boundary of Carriage Hill
Subdivision No.1, as same is recorded in Book 26 of plats at Page 29, records of Canyon
County, Idaho,
North 30°50'44" West, 246.17 feet; thence
North 21°38'55" West, 298 67 feet; thence
North 9°10'01" West, 78.29 feet; thence
North 7°00'43" West, 94.64 feet; thence
34.45 feet along the arc ~a curve to the left, having a radius of 172.00 feet, a central
angle of 11°28'39" and a long chord bearing North 12°45'03" West, 34.40 feet; thence
North 71°30'38" East, 131.75 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING.
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OCT 2 1 2010
David E. Wishney, I.S.B. #1993
Chad E. Bernards, I.S.B. #7441
Attorney and Counselor at Law
988 S. Longmont, Suite 100
P.O. Box 837
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-5955
Fax: (208) 336-5956

J. DAVID NAVARRO. Clerk
By CARlY LAnMORE
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Washington Federal Savings
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS,
a United States Corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
H. CRAIG VAN ENGELEN and KRISTEN

L. VAN ENGELEN,
Defendants.

CASE NO. CV OC 0917209
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

ORIGINAL

Plaintiff, Washington Federal Savings ("Washington Federal"), by and through its counsel
of record respectfully submits the following Reply Memorandum In Support Of Motion For
Summary Judgment.

I.
ARGUMENT
In this action, the Plaintiff seeks recovery ofthe combined deficiency balances remaining due
following non-judicial foreclosures of six land/development and construction loans made by
Washington Federal Savings ("Washington Federal") to Van Engelen Development, Inc., ("VED").
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUMMARY OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT - PAGE 1
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)

The individual Defendants, Craig and Kristen Van Engelen, ("Van Engelens"), are the guarantors
of the six VED loans. The Van Engelens argue that the Continuing General Guaranty Agreement
(the "Guaranty") signed by them either (1) does not extend to the VED loans; or (2) if it does apply,
then it should be held unenforceable. The lynch pin to every defense asserted by the Van Engelens
is a series of alleged mis-representations (or concealment) attributed to two Washington Federal
employees (hereinafter collectively referred to as "mis-representations"). Even assuming the misrepresentations were made, (a fact which is adamantly denied by Washington Federal), the
Defendants reliance thereon is misplaced, and their affirmative defenses are fatally defective, for two
reasons:

1.

The mis-representations (a) were made in the context of loans extended to a
borrower other than VED, and (b) were made nearly a year before closing ofthe
first of the six VED loans.

2.

Notwithstanding the mis-representations, the Van Engelens are unable to
establish one or more material elements of each affirmative defense.

In response to the Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment, the Defendants have failed to produce
any admissible evidence supporting their defenses, and as such Washington Federal's Motion For
Summary must be granted.
As set forth in Washington Federal's prior briefing, the Defendants carry the burden of proof
with respect to the affirmative defenses it asserts in their opposition to summary judgment. See,
Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho 765, 769-71, 215 P.3d 485, 489-91 (August 24, 2009) ("[W]e
conclude that a non-moving defendant has the burden of supporting a claimed affirmative defense
on a motion for summary judgment."). Further, in order to defeat summary judgment, the Van
Engelens "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Banner Life

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUMMARY OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 147 Idaho 117, _ , 206 P.3d 481, 487 (2009).
(emphasis added). Finally, a "mere scintilla" of evidence, speculation or slight doubt as to the facts
is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact. See Brown v. City ofPocatello, 148 Idaho 182, 229
P.3d. 1164 (2010); G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 808 P.2d 851 (1991).

A.

The Defendants' alleged Mis-Representations Do Not Apply to the Loans for
which Washington Federal Seeks Recovery

The Van Engelens collective recollection concerning (i) who made the mis-representations,
and (ii) whether the mis-representations were made in person or during phone conversation(s) is
hazy, at best. However, the Van Engelens are definitive in their assertion that the misrepresentations
occurred during the course of negotiation and closing of two loans on February 24,2005. 1 In their
briefing, the Van Engelens refer to the two loans as the "2005 Loans". 2 During the course of his
deposition, Craig Van Engelen described the purpose and/or context of the two loans as being for
the acquisition of Phases III and IV of the Carriage Hill Subdivision project. 3
As noted above, in this action, Washington Federal seeks recovery upon six loans extended
to VED. The first of these loans was made on January 18,2006, and the last was made on March
28,2007. 4 In distinct contrast to the six VED loans, the "2005 Loans" were extended to Northwest
Development Company, LLC, (a separate Van Engelen controlled entity), and, as alleged by the Van
Engelens, the 2005 Loan documents were executed on February 24, 2005 to facilitate Northwest

1,13-15, Affidavit of Craig Van Engelen;, 12-14, Affidavit of Kristen Van Engelen.
2

Pg. 6, line 4, Opposition To Motion For Summary Judgment

3

Craig Van Engelen depo. pps. 26-27; 34, 37, 38-39

4

Exhibit Nos. 1 and 6 to Deposition of Craig Van Engelen.
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Development's acquisition ofphases III and IV of Carriage Hill. 5 Washington Federal does not seek
recovery upon either of the 2005 Loans. The Van Engelens have offered no evidence whatsoever
concerning the six loans made to VED. Thus, even when the mis-representation evidence is viewed
in a light most favorable to the Defendants, it fails to support the Van Engelens' arguments for
invalidating their Guaranty ofthe six VED loans. As a matter oflaw, Washington Federal's Motion
for Summary Judgment must be granted.

It is also noteworthy that, according to Craig Van Engelen, the topic of personal guaranties
arose in connection with the 2005 Loans because of the Van Engelens' recently adoption ofa policy
whereby they would no longer offer personal guaranties ofloans made to their development entities. 6
However, it is clear that the Van Engelens quickly abandoned this policy when, commencing on or
March 22,2005, and continuing through April, 2007, they executed a series of personal guaranty
agreements for loans extended to various development entities by Mountain West Bank and Bank
of The Cascades.

B.

7

The Defendants Cannot Meet Their Burden on Their Affirmative Defenses

Even assuming the Van Engelens allegations of misrepresentation occurred, they Van
Engelens have not meet their burden of proof for any of the affirmative defenses set forth in their

5 Supplemental Affidavit of Bryan Churchill. (The files from which the documents
attached to the affidavit of Mr. Churchill were produced to the Defendants in response to their
discovery requests).

6

Craig Van Engelen depo. pps. 40-42.

Aff. Of Counsel, Exhibit 6 (exhibit 10 attached thereto), and Exhibit 7, (exhibit nos. 29 attached thereto).
7
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Amended Answer.
(1)

Waiver, Equitable
Inducement

Estoppel,

Misrepresentation

and Fraudulent

As correctly briefed and cited by Defendants in their opposition memorandum, a common
element to the defenses of waiver, equitable estoppel, misrepresentation/fraud and fraudulent
inducement, is reliance. See Magic Valley Foods, Inc. v. Sun Valley Potatoes, Inc. 134 Idaho 785,
788,10 P.3d 734, 737 (2000); Terrazasv. Blaine County ex rei. Bd. oICom'rs, 147 Idaho 193, 200n.
2,207 P.3d 169, 176 n.2 (2009); Country Cove Development, Inc. v. May, 143 Idaho 595, _, 150
P.3d 288, 293 (2006); Aspiazu v. Mortimer, 139 Idaho 548, 550, 82 P.3d 830,832 (2003). In their
response to the Plaintiffs Motion, the Van Engelens have failed to submit admissible evidence
demonstrating that they relied upon any alleged misrepresentation to their detriment.
The Van Engelens allege, that before entering into the 2005 Loans with Washington Federal,
they solicited loan proposals from other lending institutions, that the other banks submitted "stronger
proposals", which did not require the Van Engelens to personally guaranty the loans. 8 In substance,
the Van Engelens assert that but for their reliance upon Washington Federal's misrepresentations,
they could have secured loans with a competing bank without the necessity of a personal guaranty.
In order to establish this element of their defenses, the Van Engelens must necessarily introduce
evidence of the terms offered by the competing banks.
In his deposition, Craig Van Engelen testified that the competing bank proposals were

8 ~~ 9 and 11, Aff. of Craig Van Engelen, ~ 9 of Aff. of Kristen Van Engelen; Craig Van
Engelen depo. pg. 26-28.
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provided in writing, and that the proposals were probably in the landfill. 9 Thus, the "reliance"
evidence proffered by the Van Engelens consists entirely of testimony concerning the contents of
writings that have not been offered into evidence.
When evidence presented in an opposition to a motion for summary judgment is challenged
as being inadmissible, the trial court must determine the admissibility of the evidence before ruling
on the motion. Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 46, 844 P.2d 24, 28 (Ct.App.1992). The Defendants'
oral allegations that other banks submitted written proposals which did not require a personal
guaranty is inadmissible hearsay. LR.E. 801 (c) defines hearsay as "a statement, other than one made
by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted." LR.E. 802 reads: "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or
other rules promulgated by the Supreme Court ofIdaho." Any reference to the contents of the loan
proposals is inadmissible hearsay should not be considered by the Court in reaching a decision on
the Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment.
The Van Engelens' reliance argument is further undermined by Craig Van Engelen specific
admission that the competing loan proposals he solicited were "not on the six loans" {at issue in this
lawsuit}, but were solicited "on the Carriage Hill No.3 and 4 loans". 10

(2)

Quasi Estoppel

The Van Engelens' quasi-estoppel argument is equally lacking in merit. Simply put,
Washington Federal did not change its position concerning the necessity ofa personal guaranty. As

9

Craig Van Engelen depo. pgs. 27, 44.

10

Craig Van Engelen depo. pps. 26-27.
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demonstrated above, the six VED loans at issue in this lawsuit are distinct transactions from the 2005
Loans upon which the Van Engelens rely. The subject Guaranty imposes personal liability upon the
Van Engelens for obligations taken out and defaulted upon by Van Engelen Development, not
Northwest Development. Moreover, no advantage to Washington Federal, nor a disadvantage to the
Defendants occurred other than what was contracted for under the Guaranty. Finally, Defendants
were not induced to change positions, because as argued above, there is no admissible evidence to
prove the Defendants would or could have obtained loans from other banks without the requirement
of a personal guaranty.

(3)

Unclean Hands

Because Washington Federal brings a legal claim, as opposed to an equitable claim,
under the Guaranty based upon Van Engelen Development's default upon its promissory notes,
the Defendants' affirmative defense of unclean hands is inapplicable in this instance.

(4)

Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

An implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing only arises as to terms agreed to by the
parties. Lettunich v. Key Bank National Assoc., 141 Idaho 362, 368, 109 P.3d 1104, 1110 (2005).
(emphasis added). Clearly a valid contract exists between Washington Federal and the Van Engelens
in the form of the subject Guaranty of the VED loans. However, the Defendants' allegations of
misrepresentations relating to the 2005 Loans necessarily relate to a separate contract/guaranty in
which the Van Engelens obligated themselves to guaranty the obligations ofNorthwest Development
- a separate and distinct party under a separate and distinct contract. Therefore, as a matter oflaw,
no affirmative defense for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing lies under

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUMMARY OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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the subject Guaranty.

(5)

The Defendants' Argument Regarding No Damages, Unjust Enrichment,
Failure to Mitigate, and Double Recovery are Not Supported by Idaho Law

The Defendants argue that in the event the Guaranty is found to be enforceable against them,
there exists genuine issues of material fact on whether Washington Federal actually suffered any
damages or that it failed to mitigate its damages. Defendants' argument (which same argument they
made and the Court rejected at Washington Federal's Motion for a Protective Order on August 12,
2010) reasons that because Washington Federal owns the real property collateral by virtue of
trustees' sales, it has on obligation to mitigate its damages through future sales of the property.
While Washington Federal does not contest that there exists a general duty to mitigate
damages, such duty must only be reasonable. 0 'Neil v. Vasseur, 118 Idaho 257, 262, 796 P.2d 134,
139 (Ct.App. 1990). Here, Washington Federal acted reasonably by properly foreclosing upon the
collateral via notice and sale pursuant to Idaho Code § 45-1501, et seq. Once a sale is made pursuant
to Idaho Code § 45-1501, et seq. all interest in the property is foreclosed and terminated as to all
persons having an interest therein (and entitled to notice under the act) and there is no right of
redemption. See, Idaho Code § 45-1508. The Defendants, as guarantors, have no right to look to
the real property collateral in an effort to lessen its damages.

Because the Defendants

unconditionally guaranteed the obligations of Van Engelen Development, any implied obligation
which limits Washington Federal's right of recovery, (i.e. an implied obligation to develop or sell
the property at a later date), is improper.
Following the Defendants' logic, if Washington Federal chose to hold onto the real property
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collateral for twenty years or more before deciding to sell off parcels (or in whole), the Court would
be required to retain jurisdiction over this matter indefinitely to make a determination of damages.
As titled owners of the collateral, Washington Federal can elect to either sit on the property or begin
selling it immediately without reduction of the amount of damages owed under contract (not statute)
by the Defendants-Guarantors, who never had an interest in the property to being with.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Defendants' failure to mitigate damages argument fails
too because, as outlined at length above, the alleged misrepresentations and concealment by
Washington Federal apply to different loan transactions than the damages which Washington Federal
seeks under this lawsuit.
II.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons outlined above, Washington Federal respectfully requests summary judgment
judgment against the Van Engelen Defendants, establishing both their liability, and the damages
arising from the Guaranty that they executed on behalf of Van Engelen Development, Inc., in respect
to the six defaulted loans that have been placed at issue in this action.

s:.t-

Respectfully submitted this'? 1- day of October, 2010.
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Thomas Banducci
Wade Woodard
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US. Mail
V/Hand Delivered
_ Overnight Mail
_ Facsimile No. (208) 342-4455

802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
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Attorney for Washington Federal Savings
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Dara Labrum (lSB No. 1177)
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802 W. Bannock, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702
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AUorneys for DefendanlS
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDIClAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, a
United States Corporation,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV..OC 0917209
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF CRAIG
VAN ENGELEN IN OPPOSITION TO
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

VS.

H. CRAIG VAN ENGELEN and KRISTEN
VAN ENOELEN J
Defendants.
Countyof_

)

State of

): ss
)

H. Craig Van Engelen, first being duly sworn, subscribes and states as follows!
1. J make this affida\lit upon my personal knowledge.
2. I am a Defendant in the above-<:aptioned case

3. Northwest Developm(lnt Company, LLC. and Van Enge\cn Devc:lopment, LLC. ace
entities wholly owned by my wife and mo.

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF CRAfG VAN ENGELEN IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1

00451'
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27. 201 oc 2: 32PM

Woodard

&Schwartzman

No. 2228

P. 3/5'. oz

4. In November andlor December 2004~ I, had meetings with Dale Sullivan of Washington
federal Bank In which Washington Federal made overtures to repair our relationship and
solicit our business.

S. In early 200S, I had conversations with Bryarl Churchill about loans for the purchase of
the CalTiage Hill 3 and 4 Property. As J testified in my deposition, I told Mr. Churchill:
UThis is what it's going to take for you to get our business, and it's going to have to have
these three elements, -I I.e. ten percent down) fl $50,000 interest reserve, and 110 personal
gulU'antees.

6. This was important to me' because at that time) we had decided on a policy of not signing
personal guarantees; also, other banks had submitted proposals not reqUiring personal

guarantees.
7. Mr. Churchill subsequently told me that the Washington Federal Wl'lS willing to move

forward whh no personal guarantees.
8. At closing on the loans for the purchase of th" Carriage Hill 3 and 4 property by
Northwest Development Company, LLe, in February 2005, we confl.m\ed this with the
Washington Federal personnel who were present at clOSing, and were assured by these
individuals thQt no personal gulU'anr.ee was necessary because of the good standing of our
businesses and our reputation.
9. As we proceeded with the Carriage Hill project, including the construction of homes

thereon, we caused Van Enge/en Development, LLC, to enter into later loans with
WQshington Federal, including the six: roans at issue in this case.
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10. Other than to confirm my signature, Washington Federal did not depose me about these
later loans that are the very subject of its lawsuit. but only those entered into in February
2005.

It. As I had previously communicated to Washington Federal on numerous occasions, it was
important to me that loans not be subject to a personal guarantee. As with the laMs in

Pebruary 2005, when we signed the later loans we were nor required to sign personal
guarantees, these later loans contained no reference to any personal guarantee, and
Washington Federal personnel did not inform us that these later loans were subject to a
personal guarantee.
12. We had no reason to think that any personal uuarantee applied to these later loans
because: (1) we had previously communicated to the Bank that one of the prerequisites
for our business was no personal guarantee; (2) we had confirmed this with respect to the
loans in February 2005; (3) with respect to the loans in February 2005, Washington
Federal had twice lold us that no personal guarantee would apply; (4) the later 103l1s were
substantially for the same prq,iect (Carriage Hill); and (5) Washington Federal never
mentioned or contended that, contrary to the agreemen[ made in February 2005. these
later loans would be subject to iI personal guarantee.
DATED this,,2.J dllyofOctober, 20]0.

G~
H. Craig Van Eogelen

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me Ihis~J

#

of October. 20 .-----.,
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 27fh day of October 2010, a true and correct copy of the
within and foregoing instrument was served upon:
David E. WisImey
Attorney and Counselor at Law
988 S. Longmont) Ste. 100
P.O. Box 837
Boise, ill 83701

o
o Hand Delivery
o Overnight Delivery

U.S.Mail
g.pacsimile (208) 336-5956
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D~Parker
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David E. Wishney, 1.S.B. #1993
Chad E. Bernards, 1.S.B. #7441
Attorneys and Counselors at Law
988 S. Longmont, Suite 100
P.O. Box 837
Boise,ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-5955
Fax: (208) 336-5956

J.

Attorneys for Washington Federal Savings

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, a
United States Corporation,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
H. CRAIG V AN ENGELEN and KRISTEN
VAN ENGELEN,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE No. CV-OC 0917209
MOTION TO STRIKE AND
TO SHORTEN TIME

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, by and through its
counsel of record, and pursuant to Rules 12(f) and 56(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure
respectfully moves this Court for an Order striking portions of the Supplemental Affidavit of Craig
Van Engelen in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment filed on October 27, 2010.
Specifically, Plaintiff seeks an order striking the language in paragraph 6 of said supplemental
affidavit reading: " ... other banks had submitted proposals not requiring personal guarantees."

MOTION TO STRIKE AND TO SHORTEN TIME - Page 1

ORIGINAL

Plaintiff further requests the Court, pursuant to Rule 6(d) of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure, to allow this matter to be argued at the time set for hearing upon the pending Motion For
Summary Judgment, on October 28, 2010, at 3:30 p.m.
This Motion is filed contemporaneously with Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion
to Strike.
Dated this 28 th day of October, 2010.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document entitled
MOTION TO STRIKE, was served this 28 th day of October, 2010, on the following by:
Thomas Banducci
Wade Woodard
DaraLabrum
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83702

u.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
_ 9>'-ernight Mail
_~_a
accsimile No. (208) 342-4455

~
Attorney for Washington Federal Savings
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OCT 28 2010
David E. Wishney, LS.B. #1993
Chad E. Bernards, LS.B. #7441
Attorneys and Counselors at Law
988 S. Longmont, Suite 100
P.O. Box 837
Boise,ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-5955
Fax: (208) 336-5956

J. DAV/O NAVARRO, Cllitrk

Attorneys for Washington Federal Savings

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, a
United States Corporation,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
H. CRAIG V AN ENGELEN and KRISTEN
V AN ENGELEN,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE No. CV-OC 0917209
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
STRIKE

-----------------------------)
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS ("Washington
Federal"), by and through its counsel of record, and respectfully submits this Memorandum in
Support of Plaintiff s Motion to Strike filed simultaneously herewith.

I. INTRODUCTION
The Defendants, Craig and Kristen Van Engelen have opposed Washington Federal's Motion
for Summary Judgment in reliance upon the Affidavits Craig and Kristen Van Engelen filed on May

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE- Page 1
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13, 2010 and the Supplemental Affidavit of Craig Van Engelen ("Supplemental Affidavit") filed on
October 27,2010, along with the various deposition transcripts on file before the Court.
In its Motion, Washington Federal objects to a specific portion of paragraph 6 of the
Supplemental Affidavit that reads" " ... other banks had submitted proposals not requiring personal
guarantees." Washington Federal requests that the Court strike said portion of the Supplemental
Affidavit as inadmissible hearsay and that the Court exclude any argument offered by the Defendants
relying upon said inadmissible evidence for the purposes of Washington Federal's Motion for
Summary Judgment.

II. ARGUMENT
The identified portion of the Supplemental Affidavit is inadmissible hearsay and should be
stricken. Rule 56(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure reads in part: "Supporting and opposing
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated
therein." (emphasis added). In considering evidence presented either in support of or in opposition
to a motion for summary judgment "a court will consider only that material contained in affidavits
or depositions which is based upon personal knowledge and which would be admissible at trial."
Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 46, 844 P.2d 24,28 (Ct.App.1992) citing Petricevich v. Salmon River
Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865,869,452 P.2d 362, 366 (1969). (emphasis added). In sum, the threshold
question of admissibility of evidence contained in affidavits and depositions must be first determined
by the trial court prior to ruling upon a motion for summary jUdgment. Ryan, 123 Idaho at 45-46,
Hecla Mining Co., v. Star-Morning Mining Co., 122 Idaho 778, 784, 839 P.2d 1192, 1198 (1992).
I.R.E. 801 (c) defines hearsay as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
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testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." LR.E.
802 reads: "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or other rules promulgated
by the Supreme Court ofIdaho."
In this instance, the Defendants have advanced reliance arguments that are solely premised
upon unsubstantiated, oral assertions that other lending institutions submitted "stronger proposals"
not requiring personal guarantees. 1 Further, the Defendants allege that said proposals were in writing
but are probably now somewhere in a landfil1. 2 These oral assertions by the Defendants of other
written proposals are classic examples of hearsay as they are offered for no other purpose than to say
they had "stronger offers" from other banks that did not require personal guarantees. Further, none
of the hearsay exceptions pursuant to LR.E. 803 are available or applicable to the Defendants. The
Defendants have produced no admissible evidence to support their reliance arguments or to
otherwise assert they were induced to change positions regarding their contention that they could
obtain loans from other lending institutions without the requirement of a personal guaranty.
Accordingly, Washington Federal requests that its Motion to Strike be granted.

III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons outlined above, Washington Federal requests that its Motion to Strike be
granted and that the above-identified portion of the Supplemental Affidavit be stricken. Further,
Washington Federal requests that any argument offered by the Defendants in their opposition to
Washington Federal's Motion for Summary Judgment in reliance upon said hearsay evidence be

~~ 9 and 11, Aff. of Craig Van Engelen, ~ 9 of Aff. of Kristen Van Engelen; Craig Van
Engelen depo. pg. 26-28; ~ 6 of Supplemental Affidavit of Craig Van Engelen.
I

2Craig Van Engelen depo. Pgs, 27, 44.
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE- Page 3
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disregarded and/or stricken by the Court as inadmissible.
Dated this 28 th day of October, 2010.

c~-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document entitled
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE, was served this
28 th day of October, 2010, on the following by:

Thomas Banducci
Wade Woodard
DaraLabrum
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
_ Overnight Mail
V"Facsimile No. (208) 342-4455

802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83702

Chad E. Bernards
Attorney for Washington Federal Savings
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Thomas A. Banducci (lSB No. 2453)
tbanducci@bwslawgroup.com

Wade L. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)
wwoodard@bwslawgroup.com

Dara Labrum (ISB No. 7177)
dlabrum@bwslmvgroup.com
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN

PLLC

802 W. Bannock, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone (208) 342-4411
Facsimile (208) 342·4455

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, a
United States Corporation,

Case No. CV ~OC 0917209
AFFIDAVIT OF CRAIG VAN ENGELEN IN
SUPPORT OF SUPPLEMENTAL BRJEF IN
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
VS.

H. CRAIG VAN ENGELEN and KRISTEN
V AN ENGELEN,

Defendants.

County of Ada

)

State of Idaho

)

): S3

H. Craig Van Engelen, fIrst being duly sworn, subscribes and states as follows:

1. I make this affidavit upon my personal knowledge.
2. I am a Defendant in the above-captioned case.

3. My wife, Kristen Van Engelen and 1 are the sole owners of several entities.

Northwest Development Company, LLC, and Van Engelen Development, LLC are
only two of several entities that we own.
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4. When Washington Federal Savings ("the Bank") approached me in late 2004 to
solicit business from me and Kristen, they were not soliciting business from any
particular entity; they were soliciting business from any of the entities I owned jointly
with Kristen. When it approached me, thl~ Bank made clear that it wanted a
relationship with me and Kristen so that it could have access to loaning money to all
of the entities we controlled.

5. When I first had discussions with Brian Churchill about loans for the Carriage Hill
project, Kristen and I had not detennined which of our several entities would be
involved in the development of that projel~t or if a new entity would be used to
develop the project. Much of the decision as to which entity we would use had to do
with tax planning. As it turned out, Northwest Development Company, LLC, and
Van Engelen Development, LLC were both used in the development of the Carriage

Hill project.
6. Dill'ing those discussions with Mr. Churchill, I made it very clear that Kristen and I
would not cause any of our entities to do business with the Bank if doing so required
us to personally guaranty any loans. Because of our previous bad experience with the
Bank, I was very demanding about the conditions under which we would do future
business with the Bank. Around that time I had also decided after talking with another
developer that if possible I would not personally guarantee any further loans. While
times were good, this policy worked. In that regard, during the conversations with
Brian Churchill regarding loans for the Carriage Hill project, he never mentioned that
we had signed continuing personal guarantees on behalf of some of our entities,
including both Northwest Development Company, LLC, and Van Engelen
AFFIDA VIr OF CRAIG V AN ENGELEN IN SUPPORT OF SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN
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Development, LLC. Instead he assured me that personal guarantees would not be
required for future loans.
7. As discllssed in my deposition, at that time J was not willing to enter into any loans
with the Bank on behalf of any of my entities if doing so required Kristen and me to
personally guaranty such loans. It didn't matter to me which of my wholly-owned
entities took out the toan, Kristen and I simply were not willing to guaranty any loans
made by the Bank. We believed that the property we were using as collateral, at the
time, was more than sufficient to protect the Bank should a default arise.
8. Since my first affidavit, I have been able 10 review the Bank's documents. Before
that time, we did not have many documents concerning our dealings with the Bank in
our possession because the documents had been lost over the course of several moves.
Upon reviewing the Bank's documents, I realized that the first two loans for the
Carriage Hill development were made to ~\Jorthwest Development, LLC, not Van
Engelen Development, LLC as I originally recalled. At the time of my first affidavit,
I thought all of the loans for the Carriage Hill project were made to Van Engelen
Development, LLC. In any event, we were assured by the Bank that the first two
loans would not have personal guarantees attached to them. The Bank made these
assurances despite their knowledge that my wife and r had signed continuing
guarantees covering any loans made to Northwest Development, LLC.
9. We subsequently caused another one of our entities, Van Engelen Development,
LLC, to take out the loans at issue in the instant lawsuit for the further development
of the Carriage Hill project. I cannot recall why we switched to Van Engelen
Development, LLC from Northwest Dev1;:iopment, LLC for the at-issue loans. To
AFFIDAVIT OF CRAIG VAN ENGELEN IN SUPPORT OF SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN
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Kristen and me, it really was immaterial which entity took out the loans, because our
policy as I stated in my deposition was still the same: we would not take out any
loans on behalf of any of our entities if we had to personally guaranty those loans.
This was made clear to the Bank in our initial conversations as well as in 1ater
conversations.
10. Despite making it clear that we would not take out any loans if we had to personal1y
guaranty such loans, the Bank never disclosed to us that the loans would be
personally guaranteed. At no time during the negotiations and closings for any of the
loans taken out by entities owned by me and my wife after those initial conversations
in late 2004/early 2005, did anyone from the Bank infonn us that we had already
signed guarantees and that those guarantees would apply to the new loans taken out
by our entities between 2005 and 2007. Because we had been previously told that the
loans we caused our businesses to borrow would not be guaranteed, I believed that
the loans at issue in this lawsuit were not guaranteed by Kristen and me. Indeed, we
caused Van Engelen Development, LLC 10 borrow the money from the Bank in
reliance on the Bank's representations tha.t the loans would not be guaranteed.
11. Had we been told that any of those loans were personally guaranteed, we would not

have caused our wholly-owned entities to take out those loans, which include the
loans at-issue in this case that were taken out by Van Engelen Development, LLC.
We plainly were not interested in doing any business with the Bank if it required

personal guarantees.
12. The Bank's current position that the loans it made to Van Engelen Development, LLC
in 2006 and 2007 are personally guaranteed is completely contrary to the position the
AFFIDAVIT OF CRAIG VAN ENGELEN IN SUPPORT OF SUPPLEMENTAl.. BRIEF IN
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Bank took with me when it solicited business from my wife and I in late 2004 and
early 2005.
DATED this

g

day of November. 2010.

H. Craig Van Engelen
SUBSCRlBED AND SWORN before me thiH

:.5 day of November. 2010

----~-~~~~~~
"..~;.~.,.
KEElY K. ODELL
A~~;:f\ NOlary Public, State of Texas
~';'" ~ .1.:1 My Commission Expires
"'::!.~w.y.:~"

MAY 17. 2013

lIooo=-~
.... '=-~
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the S~day of November, 2010, a true and correct copy
of the within and foregoing instrument was served upon:
David E. Wishney
Attorney and Counselor at Law
988 S. Longmont, Ste. 100
P.O. Box 837
Boise, ID 83701

~U.S. Mail

D
D
D

Facsimile (208) 336-5956
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
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Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
tbanducci@bwslawgroup.com
Wade L. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)
wwoodard@bwslawgroup.com
Dara Labrum (ISB No. 7177)
dlabrum@bwslawgroup.com
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC
802 W. Bannock, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone (208) 342-4411
Facsimile (208) 342-4455

Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, a
United States Corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CV-OC 0917209

SUPPLEMENT~L BRIEF IN
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

H. CRAIG VAN ENGELEN and KRISTEN
VAN ENGELEN,
Defendants.

The Defendants H. Craig Van Engelen and Kristen Van Engelen ("Defendants" or "the
Van Engelens"), by and through their counsel of record, submit this Supplemental Brief in
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to the Court's request. This brief is
supported by the Affidavit of Craig Van Engelen in Support of Supplemental Brief in Opposition
to Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter "3 rd Craig Aff.").

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - I
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I.

INTRODUCTION

On October 28,2010, this Court requested that the parties present supplemental brieting
on the applicability of the statute of frauds and to clarify any misunderstanding regarding the
facts. See 10/28/2010 Transcript of Proceedings attached hereto as Ex. A. In their amended
answer and in their opposition brief, the Van Engelens raised the defenses of waiver, equitable
estoppel, quasi estoppel, unclean hands, fraud and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. Each of those defenses are either exceptions to the statute of frauds or are defenses to
which the statute of frauds simply does not apply. Therefore, although the guarantees are
governed by the statute of frauds, the USA Fertilizer case and the statute of frauds principles
raised in that case do not act as a bar to the Van Engelens' defenses. Moreover, as is shown
below, the Bank's misrepresentations concerning whether loans taken out by entities owned by
the Van Engelens were not limited to loans taken out by Northwest Development, LLC. The
representations concerning the loans taken out by Northwest Development, LLC, however, are
relevant to the course of conduct that led to the Van Engelens' decision to cause Van Engelen
Development, LLC to take out the loans at issue in this case.

II.

ARGUMENT

At the outset, it is important to note that because summary judgment is a drastic remedy,
the facts must be liberally construed in favor of the Van Engelens. Mackay v. Four Rivers
Packing Co., 145 Idaho 408, 410, 179 P.3d 1064, 1066 (2008). Indeed, the Court must "draw all
reasonable inferences from the record in favor of [the Van Engelens]." Hecla }v1ining Co. v. Starlvlorning klining Co., 122 Idaho 778, 784, 839 P.2d 1192, 1198 (1992).
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A.

The Bank's Misrepresentations Concerning the Personal Guarantees Extended to
Loans to Both Northwest Development and Van Engelen Development.
At the hearing, the Court commented that it did not believe any representations

concerning loans made to Northwest Development, LLC were relevant to this case since the
loans at issue were made to Van Engelen Development, LLC. From the Court's comments it
appears that the Court misunderstands the facts and that further clarification is necessary.
Therefore, pursuant to the Court's offer, the Van Engelens will now clarify the negotiations and
representations leading up to the loans that are at issue in this lawsuit and explain why those
negotiations and representations are relevant to the matter at hand.
First, it is important to clarify that when Washington Federal Savings ("the Bank")
approached Craig Van Engelen in 2004, it approached him to solicit business from the Van
Engelens, not from any particular entity the Van Engelens owned. (Affidavit of Craig Van
Engelen in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Craig Aff.") at ~ 7; 3rd
Craig Aff. at '14.) The Van Engelens own several entities through which they develop real
property. (Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter
"Labrum Atl")

~

6, Ex. D (Deposition Transcript of Henry Craig Van Engelen (hereinafter

"Craig Depo")) at 6:5-12:4; 3rd Craig Aff. at ~ 3.) Northwest Development, LLC and Van
Engelen Development, LLC are only two of those entities. (Jd)
The Van Engelens had not done business with the Bank for a couple of years due to a
previous bad experience, and thus were not eager to do business with the Bank again. (Craig
Aff. at ~ 6.) Consequently, they were demanding about the terms on which they would do
business with the Bank in the future. Indeed, they would not do any future business with the
Bank if doing so required personal guarantees. (3rd Craig Aff. at ~~ 6-7; Craig Depo at 34:2335: 19.) In that regard, after a conversation with another developer in 2005, Craig Van EngeJen
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detennined that he would no longer cause any of his businesses to take out loans that were
backed by personal guarantees. (Craig Depo. at 40: 15-41: 18.) While this policy worked during
the housing boom, it had to be re-evaluated after the crash of the real estate market. (3rd Craig
Aff. at ~ 6.) Craig Van Engelen made this policy clear to the Bank. (Id. at ~~ 6-7; Craig Depo at
34:23-35: 19.)
In early 2005, the Van Engelens began developing the Carriage Hill project. (Craig Aff.
at ~ 8.) At the time that Craig Van Engelen first discussed the project with Brian Churchill from
the Bank, the Van Engelens had not decided which of their various entities would develop the
project. (3rd Craig Aff. at ~ 5.) However, in those initial conversations it was discussed that the
loans for the project would not be guaranteed. (Id. at ~~ 5-7; Craig Aff. at

'l,r 10-12.)

It was not

until later that it was decided that the first two loans for the project would be taken out by
Northwest Development, LLC. (3rd Craig AfT at ~ 5.) As it turned out, Northwest
Development Company, LLC, and Van Engelen Development, LLC were both used in the
development of the Carriage Hill project and both borrowed money from the Bank for the
project. (Id.)
Thus, the relationship the Bank was seeking when it made its representations was a
relationship with the Van Engelens, not any particular entity owned by the Van Engelens. And
in that regard Craig Van Engelen told Brian Churchill that for the Bank to get the Van Engelens'
business it would need to make the loan to the Van Engelen businesses without personal
guaranties from the Van Engelens. (Craig Depo at 34:23-35:19; 3rd Craig Aff. at ~~ 5-7.)
Churchill responded by assuring the Van Engelens that personal guarantees would not be
required for future loans from the Bank. (3rd Craig Aff. at ~ 6; Craig Depo. 34:4-36: 11.) The
representation was reaffirmed during the closings for the 2005 loans to Northwest Development.
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(3rd Craig Aff. at ~ 8.) In fact, Gloria Henson from the Bank specifically told the Van Engelens
that no guaranties were required because the Van Engelens had done business with the Bank for
so many years with a successful track record. (Craig Depo at 32:20-33:9.)
The Van Engelens subsequently caused another one of their entities, Van Engelen
Development, LLC, to take out the loans for the further development of the Carriage Hill project.
(3rd Craig Aff. at ~ 9.) Those loans are the loans at issue in this lawsuit. (ld.) The
Van Engelens cannot recall why they switched to Van Engelen Development, LLC from
Northwest Development, LLC for the at-issue loans. (Craig Depo. at 47:8-21.) However, to
them it was immaterial which entity took out the loans, because of their stated policy to the Bank
that they would not take out any loans on behalf of any of their entities if they had to personally
guarantee those loans. (3rd Craig Aff. at ~ 7.) After reaffirming that the loans were not
guaranteed during the closing of the Northwest Development, LLC loans, the Bank failed to
inform the Van Engelens of their new position that the subsequent loans to Van Engelen
Development, LLC for the same project would be personally guaranteed. (ld. at 'J~ 9-10.)
As with the Northwest Development loans, the Bank never disclosed to the Van Engelens
during any negotiations for the at-issue loans to Van Engelen Development, LLC and the
closings of those loans that the loans would be personally guaranteed. (ld.) Indeed, at no time
during the negotiations and closings for any of the loans taken out by entities owned by the Van
Engelens after those initial conversations in late 2004/eariy 2005, did anyone from the Bank
inform them that they had already signed guarantees and that those guarantees would apply to
the new loans taken out by their entities between 2005 and 2007.' (3rd Craig Aff. at 'J~6-11;
Craig Aff. at ~~ 11-20; Craig Depo. at 18:23-19:3,20:20-2110,21:20-22:19; 42:4-14.) Because
they had been previously told that the loans they caused their businesses to borrow would not be
I

Notably, the Bank does not dispute this fact.
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guaranteed, they believed that the loans at issue in this lawsuit were not guaranteed. (Jd.)
Indeed, they caused Van Engelen Development, LLC to borrow money from the Bank in reliance
on the Bank's representations that the loans would not be guaranteed. (Jd.)
Thus, the representations concerning the Northwest Development loans are relevant. It
was not until later in the negotiations that it was decided that the first two loans for the project
would be taken out by Northwest Development, LLC. In fact, Craig Van Engelen did not
remember that the first two loans were taken out by Northwest Development, LLC instead of
Van Engelen Development, LLC until he reviewed the documents produced by the Bank after he
filed his first affidavit; he originally remembered that all of the loans related to the Carriage Hill
project were taken out by Van Engelen Development, LLC. (3rd Craig AfT. at ~ 8.)
Accordingly, this case is not about which of the two entities owned by the Van Engelens took out
the loans because continuing guarantees had been signed as to both entities. Instead it is about
the personal guarantees signed by the Van Engelens and the Bank's course of conduct with
respect to those guarantees. Indeed, the Bank's conduct and representations that the first two
loans were not guaranteed, coupled with the Bank's failure to disclose its position that the
subsequent loans would be guaranteed, deceitfully led the Van Engelens to believe that the
subsequent loans taken out by Van Engelen Development, LLC for the same project also were
not guaranteed.
Because of the Van Engelens' position that they would not guarantee any loans during
negotiations for the 2005 loans to Northwest Development, LLC, the Bank knew that the Van
Engelens were under the misimpression that any future loans taken out by their companies were
not subject to personal guarantee. Under those circumstances, the Bank had a duty to correct this
misimpression. Rest. 2d Torts § 551. The Bank, however, did not disclose the subsequent loans
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to Van Engelen Development, LLC were personally guaranteed by the Van Engelens. Thus, the
misrepresentations made with respect to the 2005 loans to Northwest Development, LLC create
issues of fact as to whether the 2006 and 2007 loans to Van Engelen Development were
personally guaranteed. See also infra. Part I1.B. Accordingly, on these facts, as is shown below,
the Court cannot enforce the guarantee against the Van Engelens.

B.

The Statute of Frauds Does Not Bar the Van EngeJens Defenses.
At the October 28,2010, hearing, the Court indicated its belief, based on the Court's

reading of USA Fertilizer, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat. Bank, 120 Idaho 271,815 P.2d 469 (Ct. App.
1991), that statute of frauds bars the Van Engelens' defenses. The decision in USA Fertilizer,
however, is inapposite as the statute of frauds does not bar the Van Engelens' defenses.

1.

USA Fertilizer is Inapposite.

The facts and legal principles at issue in USA Fertilizer are completely different from the
t~lctS

and defenses raised in the present case. First, the contract at issue in USA Fertilizer was not

a personal guaranty, but instead was a commitment (,thirty-day letter of guarantee") to USA
Fertilizer by the bank in that case to loan money to USA Fertilizer's customer. Id. at 272-273.
Second, and more importantly, the defenses raised by the Van Engelens in this case of waiver,
equitable estoppel, quasi estoppel, unclean hands, fraud and breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing were not at issue in USA Fertilizer.
In that case, USA Fertilizer argued that oral conversations which took place after the
commitment was made in writing were relevant to "clarify the parties' original understanding."
ld. at 275. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument stating that "to the extent USA Fertilizer

seeks to argue the evidence as altering the original terms of the guarantee, we note that such an
oral modification would be barred under the statute of frauds." Id. Here, the Van Engelens are
not seeking to modify the personal guarantees. Instead, it is the Van Engelens' position that the
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Bank has waived its right, or is estopped from seeking, to enforce the continuing personal
guarantees with respect to the loans that are at issue in this lawsuit. Nowhere in the USA

Fertilizer decision did the Court of Appeals hold that the statute of frauds bars the Van Engelens'
defenses of waiver, equitable estoppel, quasi estoppel, unclean hands, fraud and breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The case simply does not apply to the facts and defenses
at issue in the present case.

2.

The Statute of Frauds Does Not Bar the Van Engelens' Defenses

As shown below, the law is clear that the statute of frauds does not bar the Van Engelens'
defenses of waiver, equitable estoppel, quasi estoppel, unclean hands, fraud and breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

a.

The Van Engelens' Waiver Defense is not Barred by the Statute of
Frauds

The statute of frauds does not apply to this defense as this defense does not seek to
modify an existing contract or create a new contract governed by the statute of frauds. As set
forth in the Van Engelens' opposition brief, waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment ofa
known right or advantage. Margaret H Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 253, 256, 846 P.2d
904, 907 (1993). Waiver of a contract provision is shown when the intention to waive is clearly
present and the party asserting the waiver shows that he acted in reasonable reliance upon it and
that he thereby has altered his position to his detriment. Magic Valley Foods, Inc. v. Sun Valley

Potatoes, Inc., 134 Idaho 785, 788,10 P.3d 734, 737 (2000). Thus, waiver is not a modification
of contract; it is the giving up of the right to enforce the contract. Independent Gas & Oil Co. v.

T.B. Smith Co., 51 Idaho 710,10 P.2d 317, 322-23 (1932).
As such, there is no case holding that the statute of frauds bars the defense of waiver.
Indeed, the courts have recognized that a party may waive the right to enforce the terms of a
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written agreement governed by the statute of frauds. See Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103
Idaho 515,518-522,650 P.2d 657 (1982) (recognizing that a lessor may waive its right to
enforce the terms ofa lease, an agreement governed by the statute of frauds). Courts have even
recognized that a party may waive the right to enforce a clause in an agreement requiring that all
modifications be in writing. See e.g., Rules Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Us. Bank NA., 133 Idaho 669,
675-76,991 P.2d 857, 863-64 (Ct. App. 2000). Accordingly, the statute of frauds is not a bar to
the Van Engelens' waiver defense, and therefore the motion for summary judgment should be
denied because there are issues of fact as to whether the Bank waived its right to enforce the
guarantee after 2004.

b.

The Van Engelens' Equitable Estoppel Defense is not Barred by the
Statute of Frauds

The Idaho Supreme Court has long recognized that equitable estoppel prevents a party
from claiming that an oral promise is barred by the statute of frauds. Boesiger v. Freer, 85 Idaho
551,563,381 P.2d 802, 809 (1963); see also Frantz v. Parke, III Idaho 1005,729 P.2d 1068
(Ct. App. 1986). While estoppel "does not vary the statute of frauds, [it does] bar the promisor
from raising it as a defense." Frantz, III Idaho at 1010. As set forth in the Van Engelens'
initial brief, the elements of equitable estoppel are (1) a false representation or concealment of a
material fact with actual or constructive knowledge of the truth; (2) that the party asserting
estoppel did not know or could not discover the truth; (3) that the false representation or
concealment was made with the intent that it be relied upon; and (4) that the person to whom the
representation was made, or from whom the facts were concealed, relied and acted upon the
representation or concealment to his prejudice. Terrazas v. Blaine County ex rei. Bd. o/Com'rs,
147 Idaho 193,200 n. 2, 207 P.3d 169,176 n. 2 (2009).
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Here the Bank made both false representations and concealed the existence of the
continuing guarantee, a material fact that was central to the Van Engelens' decision to cause their
company to enter into the loan agreements with the Banle (Craig AfI. at ~~ 13-20; Affidavit of
Kristen Van Engelen in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Kristen
Aff.") at ~~ 12-19; 3rd Craig Aff. at ~~ 4-11.) As further clarified in the 3 Craig Aff., filed
rd

concurrently herewith, the Bank solicited the Van Engelens seeking to do business with the Van
Engelens, not any particular entity owned by the Van Engelens. (3rd Craig Aff. at ~ 4.) At that
time, the Van Engelens were beginning to develop a project named Carriage Hill, but had not
determined which of their several entities would be involved in the development of that project.

(ld. at ~ 5.) As it turned out, part of the project was developed with money loaned to Northwest
Development, LLC and another part was developed with money loaned to Van Engelen
Development, LLC. (ld. at ~~ 8-9.)
The Van Engelens made clear to the Bank that they would not do any future business
with the Bank through any of their entities if they were required to personally guarantee any
loans. (ld. at ~~ 6-10.) The Bank assured them that they would not be required to guarantee any
loans. (ld.) While making this representation, the Bank did not disclose that the guarantees the
Van Engelens had signed earlier on behalf of some of their entities, including Northwest
Development, LLC and Van Engelen Development, LLC, were continuing and would by their
terms apply to the new loans taken out by the Van Engelens on behalf of both Northwest
Development, LLC and Van Engelen Development, LLC. (ld.)
The circumstances show that these false representations and concealment were made with
the intent that the Van Engelens rely on these misrepresentations and nondisclosure to cause their
businesses to borrow money from the Bank. In light of the Bank's affirmative
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misrepresentations that no guarantee would be required for the at-issue loans and the Bank's
failure to disclose the existence of the guarantees at any of the loan closings, the Van Engelens
could not have discovered that these new loans to Northwest Development, LLC and Van
Engelen Development, LLC were covered by prior guarantees that they did not remember
signing. The Van Engelens actually relied on these statements by causing Van Engelen
Development, LLC to enter into the loan agreements with the Bank for the at-issue loans. (3rd
Craig Aff. at ~~ 10-11; Craig Aff. at ~ 13-20; Kristen Aff. at ~ 12-19; Craig Depo. 27:22-28: 11.)
Thus, because the statute of frauds is inapplicable and because there are triable issues of fact as
to whether the Bank is estopped from enforcing the guarantee with respect to the at-issue loans,
the Bank's motion for summary judgment should be denied.

c.

The Van Engelens' Quasi Estoppel Defense is not Barred by the
Statute of Frauds.

Quasi estoppel, like equitable estoppel, prevents the statute of frauds from being used as a
defense to an oral promise. See Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430, 437,80 P.3d 1031, 1038
(2003) (recognizing that quasi estoppel can be used to bar application of the statute of frauds, but
holding that the conduct at issue did not satisfy the requirements of quasi estoppel).
Accordingly, as with equitable estoppel, if the elements of quasi estoppel are satisfied, the statute
of frauds does not bar the Van Engelens from relying on the Bank's pledge that the new loans
would not be guaranteed.
As set forth in the Van Engelens' initial brief, the elements of quasi-estoppel are: (1) the
offending party took a different position than his or her original position, and (2) either (a) the
offending party gained an advantage or caused a disadvantage to the other party; (b) the other
party was induced to change positions; or (c) it would be unconscionable to permit the offending
party to maintain an inconsistent position from the one he or she has already derived a benefit or
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acquiesced in. Terrazas, 147 Idaho at 200 n. 3, 207 P.3d at 176 n. 3. There are triable issues of
fact here precluding summary judgment as the Bank's current position that the loans are
personally guaranteed, is completely contrary to its representations to the Van Engelens that the
loans made after the initial meeting in late 2004 would not be guaranteed. (3rd Craig Affidavit at
~'l
~

6-12; Craig Aft'. at

~

12-19; Kristen Aft'. at ~ 12-18; Craig Depo. p. 31 :24-33 :9; Labrum Aft'.

7, Ex. E (Transcript of Deposition of Kristen Lee Van Engelen, hereinafter "Kristen Depo. ") at

25:23-27:8 and 28: 14-23.) The Bank's position that the loans would not be guaranteed was a
key factor in the Van Engelens' decision to cause their companies to enter into loans with the
Bank after 2004. (3rd Craig Affidavit at ~~ 6-12; Craig Aff. at ~ 11-20; Kristen Aff. at ~ 12-19.)
The Bank gained an advantage because it induced the Van Engelens to cause their business to
enter loans with the Bank after the Van Engelens had determined not to do business with the
Bank. (Craig Aft'. at ~~6, 20; 3rd Craig Aff. at ~~ 6; Craig Depo at 34:23-35: 19.) It would be
unconscionable to now permit the Bank to change its position concerning the applicability of the
continuing guarantee to the at-issue loans after the Bank repeatedly took the position that the
new loans would not be guaranteed.

d.

The Van Engelens' Unclean Hands Defense is not Barred by the
Statute of Frauds.

As with waiver, the Van Engelens do not seek to use their unclean hands defense to
modify the continuing guarantee, but instead are using it to prevent the Bank from enforcing the
guarantee on the ground that the Bank's conduct "has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or
fraudulent and deceitful." Campbell v. Kildew, 141 Idaho 640, 1648, 15 P .3d 731, 739 (2005).
Therefore, the statute of frauds does not apply to this defense. The facts as set forth above and in
prior briefing demonstrate that there are triable issues of fact as to whether the Bank's conduct
has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent and deceitful. To the extent that the
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Bank seeks any equitable remedy in this case, the existence of genuine issues of material fact
preclude summary judgment.

e.

The Van Engelens' FraudlMisrepresentation Defense is not Barred by
the Statute of Frauds.

The Bank's failure to disclose the existence of the continuing guarantee and failure to
correct the Bank's misrepresentations that no guarantee would be required renders the guarantee
voidable, unenforceable, and discharges the Van Engelens. See Marine Bank, Nat. Ass 'n v. Meal

Counter, Inc., 826 F.2d 1577 (7th Cir. 1987). Section 12 of the Restatement (Third) of
Suretyship and Guaranty summarizes this principle, stating that "[i]fthe secondary obligor's
assent to the secondary obligation is induced by fraudulent or material misrepresentation by the
obligee upon which the secondary obligor is justified in relying, the secondary obligation is
voidable by the secondary obligor." Rest. 3d Sur, § 12(1). Notably, "a misrepresentation
occurring after the execution of a continuing guaranty may render the secondary obligation
voidable with respect to extensions of credit subsequent to the misrepresentation." Rest. 3d Sur,

§ 12, cmt i.; see also Sumitomo Bank o/California v. Iwasaki, 447 P.2d 956, 958 (Cal. 1968)
Because fraud renders the guaranty void, it is not a modification of the guarantee within the
statute of frauds. Therefore, the statute of frauds has no application to the Van Engelens' fraud
defense and summary judgment should not be granted on this defense as there are triable issues
of fact exist concerning whether the guaranty was rendered void by the Bank's
misrepresentations regarding the guaranty and the Bank's failure to disclose the applicability of
the guaranty to the at-issue loans.

f.

The Van Engelens' Good Faith and Fair Dealing Defense is Not
Barred by the Statute of Frauds.

The statute of frauds does not bar this defense because the defense only arises as to the
terms of the existing guaranty or the loan agreements. Idaho Power Co v. Cogeneration, Inc.,
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134 Idaho 738, 750, 9 P.3d 1204, 1216 (2000). The covenant of good faith and fair dealing
implied in the guaranty and the at-issue loan agreements requires the Bank to perform in good
faith under those contracts and breach of the duty occurs when the Bank violates, nullifies or
significantly impairs any benefit under those agreements. Idaho First Nat. Bank v. Bliss Valley
Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 287,824 P.2d 841, 862 (1991). Here, the facts demonstrate that the
Bank breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by misrepresenting that the continuing
guarantees would not apply to the loans the Van Engelens caused their business to borrow in
2005 through 2007. Even if those representations only involved the 2005 loans to Northwest
Development, it would be a breach of the covenant to tell the Van Engelens that no guarantee
applied to those loans and then not inform the Van Engelens that the prior guarantees would
apply to the subsequent loans taken out by Van Engelen Development, LLC in 2006 and 2007
when the loans to both Northwest Development, LLC in 2005 and Van Engelen Development,
LLC in 2006 and 2007 were subject to personal guarantees. (3rd Craig Aff. at ~~ 8-11.)
In that regard, as set forth in the Van Engelens' original opposition brief, a party to a
business transaction has a duty to disclose "matters known to him that he knows to be necessary
to prevent his partial or ambiguous statement of the facts from being misleading;" and "facts
basic to the transaction, if he knows that the other is about to enter into it under a mistake as to
them, and that the other, because of the relationship between them, the customs of the trade or
other objective circumstances, would reasonably expect a disclosure of those facts." Rest. 2d
Torts § 55 1(2)(b), (c), and (e). Thus, the Bank acted in bad faith by not disclosing the existence
of the guarantees when it made the at-issue loans to Van Engelen Development in 2006 and
2007. This is especially true after learning of the Van Engelens' position during the negotiations
for the 2005 loans to Northwest Development that they would not personally guarantee any loans
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from the Bank. See Rest. 2d Torts § 551 (1) ("One who fails to disclose to another a fact that he
knows may justifiably induce the other to act or refrain from acting in a business transaction is
subject to the same liability to the other as though he had represented the nonexistence of the
matter that he has failed to disclose.") Consequently, the statute of frauds does not bar this
defense.

III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the statute of frauds does not bar the Van Engelens'
defenses and as demonstrated by the affidavits, evidence, and depositions in this case, many
genuine issues of material fact exist which, if proven, prevent the Bank from enforcing the
guarantee. As such, the Van Engelens respectfully ask that the Court deny the Bank's Motion
for Summary Judgment.
DATED this 5th day of November, 2010.

Wade L. Woodard
Attorneys for the Defendants
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BOISE, IDAHO. OCTOBER 28, 2010
THE COURT: Are we ready for Van Engelen?
All right. Before we get too far into
this, I'm going to ask the marshal to give both of
you a copy of a case. And we are actually going
to continue this matter and Jet me explain why.
Neither party brought up the statute of
frauds problem that exists in this case. And I
have given you a copy of a case and I would really
like the parties to address why the statute of
frauds does not apply. And that's 9-505 ( 2)
And there's a case directly on point
that my understanding of it says that you cannot
have an oral modification of an existing written
guarantee and that guarantees all have to be in
writing or they're invalid.
And since neither party addressed this
and it may, in fact, be dispositive of the issues,
I would like to give everyone the opportunity to
address it.
And I would like responses from both
parties -- I don't see that you need to cross, you
can just waive the cross -- by November 5th, if
can respond to it.

1
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And I'd like to reset the argument and
I have a date in mind. But before we do that, I
just want to make sure that I understand this
case.
As I understand it, the Van Engelen
actually had two legal entities; one of them being
Van Engelen Development and the other one is
Northwest -- whatever it's called, LLC.
To the extent that I have testimony and
other things regarding the second entity, the
Northwest LLC, I think that's all irrelevant to
the issues here because all we have, as I
understand it, six loans entered into from 2006
on. And those loans were given -- were given to
Van Enge/en Development.
The guaranty, as I understand it, only
applies to Van Englen Development and has nothing
to do with Northwest LLC -- I can't remember what
it's called. Northwest-MR. BANDUCCI: Northwest Development.
THE COURT: Northwest Development, LLC.
Now, that's my understanding. So when
we go into the motion for summary judgment, in my
view to the extent there are these arguments about
not have
entations that

4
happened, even though I think they violate -- if
they did happen, they would violate the statute of
3 frauds.
4
But to the extent that they allegedly
5 happened, it's my understanding they all happened
6 with regard to Northwest Development.
7
And if not, you're going to have to
s prove to me - and besides that, I don't think-9 I don't think the misrepresentations -- unless I'm
10 wrong about the statute of frauds.
11
And also the fact that there is a
12 written -- in -- in the guaranty there's a
13 specific provision which requires the guarantors
14 to in writing disavow any guarantee. And as far
15 as I know, there's no indication of any written
16 documents.
17
So I'd like you to look at this case
18 and tell me whether - tell me why it doesn't
19 apply and we'll reset the oral argument.
20
And I apologize t6 counsel, but I don't
21 see any point in going forward until you have a
22, chance to look at this case.
'23
Let me ask you a question. Normally I
24 don't do things on a Friday, but Thursday,
25 November 11th is Veteran's Day. Is there
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lor 2 sheets
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possibility we could have an oral argument on
November 12th. sometime on the 12th? That's a
Friday.
MR. WISHNEY: I can do that, Judge.
MR. BANDUCCI: 1'/1 know in a second, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. BANDUCCI: I can, too, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. What good -- what is a
time - what time is good for both of you?
Because I can do it any time on the 12th.
MR. WISHNEY: If I had my druthers, Your
Honor, it would be in the morning, 10:00 o'clock
or so.
MR. BANDUCCI: It doesn't matter to me, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: That sounds fine. Why don't we
do it 10:00 o'clock, November 12th.
And then if you can get - if you can
get your response and your -- how would you treat
this particular case and the statute of frauds to
me by the close of business on November 5th.
MR. BANDUCCI: Very good, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And if I misunderstand the state
of facts, this is also
:02:141'1'1
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know that I misunderstand the state of the facts.
0 kay. Thank you. Stand in recess until 4:00.
MR. BANDUCCI: Thank you, Your Honor.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS,
a United States Corporation,
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vs.
H. CRAIG VAN ENGELEN and KRISTEN
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Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV OC 0917209

PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Pursuant to the Court's instruction at the October 28,2010 hearing on Plaintiff, Washington
Federal Saving's ("Washington Federal") Motion for Summary Judgment, Washington Federal, by
and through its counsel of record respectfully submits this Supplemental Memorandum in Support
of Summary Judgment.
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I.
FACTS ESTABLISHED BY THE RECORD
By way of review, the relevant and undisputed facts, as established by the record are as
follows:
1.

The Defendants, Craig and Kristen Van Engelen ("Defendants"), are the principals

of Van Engelen Development, Inc.("VED,,).1 The Defendants are also the principals of Northwest
Development, Inc. ("NWD,,).2
2.

In 2002, Washington Federal extended credit to VED in the an10unt of$126,000.00

("2002 Loans,,).3 On August 14, 2002, the Defendants signed a personal continuing guaranty on
behalf ofVED.4 The Continuing General Guaranty Agreement ("Guaranty"), personally guaranteed
"payment to Lender [Washington Federal] of all Obligations that Borrower [VED] owes to Lender
now or in the future.,,5 The Guaranty also reads in pertinent parts, as follows:
"Written Notice Needed to Withdraw Guarantor's Promise. Guarantor's Promise
shall be a continuing guaranty as to any present or future Obligations Borrower owes
Lender and shall remain effective until Lender actually receives written notice from

I

Craig Van Engelen depo. p. 6; Kristen Van Engelen depo. p. 6.

2 Craig Van Engelen depo. p. 6; Kristen Van Engelen depo. p. 6.
3

Dale Sullivan depo. pps. 64-65; ~ 3, Aff. Craig Van Engelen; ~ 3, Aff. Kristen Van

Engelen.
4

5

Craig Van Engelen depo. pps. 18-19; Kristen Van Engelen depo. p. 9.
~ 1, Guaranty.
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Guarantor that Guarantor withdraws Guarantor's Promise.'m
"Guarantor's Additional Waivers of Notice. Lender does not have to notify
Guarantor of any of the following events and this will not affect Guarantors Promise.
(a) Lender does not have to notify Guarantor of Lender's acceptance of Guarantor's
Promise.
(b) Lender does not have to notify Guarantor when lender lends money or extends
other credit to Borrower or acquires Obligations of Borrower." 7
3.

The 2002 Loans were paid in full by VED approximately one year after Washington

Federal extended the funds. 8
4.

In February 2005, Washington Federal extended credit to NWD ("2005 Loans")

which were used by NWD for the acquisition of Phases III and IV of the Carriage Hill Subdivision
project. 9
5.

The Defendants allege that at the closing of 2005 Loans, Washington Federal

employees (Bryan Churchill and possibly Gloria Henson) made representations that personal
guarantees would not be required for the 2005 Loans.lo
6.

In a series of six real estate development loans totaling $6,225,860.97, Washington

Federal extended credit to VED, with the first ofthese loans closing on January 18,2006 and the last
closing on March 28, 2007 ("2006-2007 Loans"). I I

6

~ 3, Guaranty.

7

~

8

~ 5, Aff. of Craig Van Engelen; ~ 5, Aff. of Kristen Van Engelen.

9

~ 13, Aff. of Craig Van Engelen; ~ 12, Aff. of Kristen Van Engelen; Craig Van Engelen

7, Guaranty.

depo. pps. 26-27; 34, 37, 38-39.
10

~ 15, Aff. of Craig Van Engelen; ~ 14, Aff. of Kristen Van Engelen.

II

~ 4, Complaint, Exhibit Nos. 1 and 6 to deposition to Craig Van Engelen.
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VED eventually defaulted on the 2006-2007 Loans. 12 Following foreclosure of the

7.

collateral securing these loans, and after applying all credits and debits, a balance of$4,452,809.67
remains due and owing. 13 The Defendants have not paid any part of this balance due. 14
8.

The Defendants have never delivered written notice of the withdrawal of their

respective guarantees ofloans extended to VED.15 Further, there is no other writing in existence that
would otherwise modify the continuing Guaranty for any and all loans extended by Washington
Federal to VED.
9.

The only recovery sought by Washington Federal in the above-captioned lawsuit

relates to the remaining deficiency for the 2006-2007 Loans extended to VED, not the 2002 Loans
to VED, nor the 2005 Loans extended to NWD.16

II.
ARGUMENT
In addition to the arguments presented in its prior summary judgment briefings, this Court
must grant Washington Federal's Motion for Summary Judgment because: (1) any alleged oral
modification ofthe Guaranty is, as a matter oflaw, barred by Idaho's statute of frauds, Idaho Code

§ 9-505(2); and (2) under the terms of the Guaranty, the Defendants expressly waived any rights
contrary to the Guaranty agreement.

12 , ,

3-6, Aff. of Bryan Churchill; p. 6, line 8, Opposition to Motion for Summary

Judgment.
13

15

"7-12, Aff. of Bryan Churchill.

Craig Van Engelen depo. pps. 19-20; Kristen Van Engelen depo. p. 31.

16 , 4, Complaint, Exhibit Nos. 1 and 6 to deposition to Craig Van Engelen.
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A.

Idaho's Statute of Frauds Bars Oral Modifications of Guarantees.

Notwithstanding the fact that the Defendants' allegations of misrepresentation and/or
concealment in relation to the NWD/2005 Loans are irrelevant for the purposes of this lawsuit as
pertaining to the VED/2006-2007 Loans, Idaho law precludes oral modifications of guarantees.
Idaho Code § 9-505 reads in part as follows:
In the following cases the agreement is invalid, unless the same or some note or
memorandum thereof, be in writing and subscribed by the party charged, or by his
agent. Evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the writing
or secondary evidence of its contents:
(2) A special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another, except
in the cases provided for in section 9-506, Idaho Code.

In USA Fertilizer, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat'/ Bank, 120 Idaho 271, 276, 815 P.2d 469,474
(Ct.App.1991), the Idaho Court of Appeals held that oral modifications ofa guarantee are barred
under the foregoing provisions ofthe statute offrauds. In USA Fertilizer, the Defendant-Bank issued
an irrevocable letter of credit guarantee in the amount of $15,000.00 in favor of Plaintiff-fertilizer
company for a term of30 days for a Shelley, Idaho farmer, Mr. Sterling Smith. Id. at 272. The bank
argued that it issued the letter of credit guaranty solely for the purpose of ensuring that the plaintiff
would not be "left hanging" pending the approval and processing of the operating loan and that once
the operating loan was approved, the plaintiff could no longer look to the letter of credit, but only
to the funds available for payment from the approved operating loan. Id. at 274-75.
The plaintiffargued, inter alia, that an additional "interpretation" ofthe 30 day letter of credit
guaranty was provided by a bank representative, which further clarified the parties' original
understanding of the letter of credit. Id. at 275. The Plaintiff alleged that during this phone call, the
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bank representative's "interpretation" allowed the plaintiffto demand payment any time Mr. Smith's
account was thirty days late and thus morphed into a continuing guarantee extending to all unpaid
billings incurred through the 1987 crop season (as opposed to just the initial application of fertilizer
to Mr. Smith's fields). Id at 273-275. In a footnote, the Court made an important distinction that
"evidence of the parties" subsequent conduct may be admissible to explain or clarify the meaning
intended by the parties to a contract. However, this principle is pertinent to issues involving the
applicability of the parol evidence exclusionary rule; it does not apply to avoid the operation of the
statute offrauds." Id. at 275. (emphasis added). The Court further held that to the extent plaintiff
sought to argue that this "evidence as altering the original terms of the guarantee, we note that such
an oral modification would be barred under the statute of frauds." Id at 275.
In the case at bar, the Defendants seek to nullify the Guaranty based upon (i) allegations that
Washington Federal orally agreed they would not be required to guaranty the NWD/2005 Loans, and
(2) the Plaintiffs failure to disclose the existence of the guaranties during closing ofthe 2006-2007
Loans to VED. In each instance, the Defendants are asking the Court to allow oral modification of
the Guaranty. The first argument necessarily relies upon an alleged oral modification of the explicit
provision of the guaranty which requires written notice of any withdrawal thereof by the guarantor.
The second argument similarly relies upon oral statements to modify the provisions of the guaranty
wherein the guarantors specific waived notice of (a) Washington Federal's acceptance of the
Defendants' promise to pay, and (b) any loans extended to VED. Based upon Idaho Code §9-505,
as interpreted in USA Fertilizer, the Defendants' arguments are fatally flawed, as a matter oflaw,
and the Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment.

In an effort to mend their misplaced allegations of misrepresentations and concealment as
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to the 2005 Loans to NWD, the Defendants, by way ofMr. Van Engelen's Supplemental Affidavit
in Opposition to Summary Judgment, attempt to marry the 2005 Loans with the 2006-2007 Loans
because VED and NWD are entities wholly owned by the Defendants and because the 2005 Loans
and the "later loans were substantially for the same project."17 On the one hand, the Defendants want
to use their beneficial corporate entity status as a shield for liability purposes, yet on the other hand
use it as a sword to say that VED and NWD are essentially one in the same (which lends itself more
to a piercing the corporate veil argument). The Defendants cannot have it both ways. The simple,
undisputed facts are that the Defendants' allegations of misrepresentation and/or concealment, even
ifproven, apply to the 2005 Loans to NWD. Mr. Van Engelen's Supplemental Affidavit serves only
to confirm these facts. Because Washington Federal seeks recovery for deficiency amounts on the
2006-2007 Loans to VED and because the statute of frauds bars any oral modifications of the
Guaranty, no affirmative defense alleged by the Defendants can stand. Therefore, this Court must
grant Washington Federal's Motion for Summary Judgment in its entirety.

B.

Under the Guaranty, the Defendants Expressly Waived Any Rights that are
Contrary to the Terms of the Guaranty.

The rights of a creditor against a guarantor are determined strictly from the terms of the
guaranty agreement. If the guaranty is clear and unequivocal, there is no occasion for the court to
consider extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent. Rather, the intent of the parties must be derived
from the language of the guaranty ifit is unambiguous. Valley Bank v. Larson, 104 Idaho 772, 775,
663 P.2d 653,656 (1983); McGill v. Idaho Bank & Trust, 102 Idaho 494, 498, 632 P.2d 683, 687
(1981); Ponderosa Paint Mfg., Inc. v. Yack, 125 Idaho 310, 319, 870 P.2d 663, 672 (Ct.App.1994);

17 Supplemental Affidavit of Craig Van Engelen in Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment, "3, 12.
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CIT Financial Services v. Herb' Indoor RV Center, Inc., 118 Idaho 185, 187, 795 P.2d 890, 892

(Ct.App.l990); Johnson Equipment v. Nielson, 108 Idaho 867, 871, 702 P.2d 905,909 (Ct.App.
1985). When the guaranty is unconditional, the guarantor may not imply limitations upon the
creditor's right to recover. CIT Financial Services v. Herb's Indoor RV Center, Inc., 118 Idaho 185,
187, 795 P.2d 890, 892 (Ct.App.l990).
In addition to the notice waiver provisions of Section 7 of the Guaranty recited on page 3
above, Defendants specifically and expressly waived any rights that are contrary to the express terms
of the Guaranty under paragraph 14 thereof, to wit:
Guarantor's Wavier of Any Rights Contrary to This Agreement. Whenever this
agreement permits Lender to do something or not do something and Guarantor has
some legal right to the contrary, Guarantor expressly waives that right.

Idaho courts have consistently upheld these types of waivers. See e.g., Valley Bank v. Larson, 104
Idaho 772, 774-76, 663 P.2d 653, 655-57 (1983); Bank of Idaho v. Colley, 103 Idaho 320, 324 &
325,647 P.2d 776, 780 & 781 (Ct.App.l982); and Mack Financial Corp. v. Scott, 100 Idaho 889,
894,606 P.2d 993, 998 (1980). Therefore, there exists no duty on behalf of Washington Federal to
disclose to the Defendants further extensions of credit made to VED or that such loans were backed
by the Guaranty. Any argument presented by the Defendants that these terms/waivers of the
Guaranty were orally modified between the parties would be barred under the statute of frauds as
outline above.
The Defendants' argument that Washington Federal somehow had a duty to continually
disclose the continuing Guaranty for the mUltiple loans extended to VED is baseless and not
sustainable under Idaho law. As the Defendants have waived any rights contrary to any terms of the
Guaranty, their affirmative defenses are, as a matter of law, without merit and summary judgment
PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY
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must be granted in favor of Washington Federal.

III.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons outlined above, together with Washington Federal's prior summary judgment
briefing and the file on record before the Court, Washington Federal requests an order for summary
judgment in its favor as to the relief sought in its Complaint.

-

Respectfully submitted this !::::::> day of November, 2010.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, a
United States Corporation,
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H. CRAIG V AN ENGELEN and KRISTEN
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MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDA VIT
OF CRAIG V AN ENGELEN IN
SUPPORT OF SUPPLEMENTAL
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
TO SHORTEN TIME

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, by and through its
counsel of record, and pursuant to Rules 12(1) and 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure
respectfully moves this Court for an Order striking the Affidavit of Craig Van Engelen in Support
of Supplemental Brief in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment filed on November 3,2010.
Plaintiff further requests the Court, pursuant to Rule 6(d) of the Idaho Rules of Civil
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Procedure, to allow this matter to be argued at the time set for hearing upon the pending Motion For
Summary Judgment, on November 12,2010, at 10:00 a.m.
This Motion is filed contemporaneously with Plaintifr s Memorandum in Support of Motion
to Strike.
Dated this

-1-

day of November, 2010.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, a
United States Corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
H. CRAIG VAN ENGELEN and KRISTEN
VAN ENGELEN,

Case No. CV-OC 0917209
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE
AFFIDA VIT OF CRAIG VAN ENGELEN IN
SUPPORT OF SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.

Defendants H. Craig Van Engelen and Kristen Van Engelen ("Defendants" or "the Van
Engelens") oppose the Motion of Plaintiff Washington Federal Savings ("Washington Federal"
or "Plaintiff') to strike the Affidavit of Craig Van Engelen in Support of Supplemental Brief in
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment ("the 3rd Affidavit").

OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF CRAIG VAN ENGELEN IN SUPPO
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - I

I

A.

The Affidavit is Timely Because its Submission was Invited by the Court
The Plaintiff complaints that the 3rd Affidavit is untimely under Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c).

However, as the Plaintiff well knows, submission of materials clarifying the facts was invited by
the Court. This is entirely permissible, because a court may modify the time period for
submission of affidavits under Rule 56(c). Sun Valley Potatoes, Inc. v. Rosholt, Robertson &
Tucker, 133 Idaho 1,5,981 P.2d 236,240 (1999).

On October 28,2010, this matter was slated for a hearing on the Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary judgment. Rather than hearing the argument of counsel, the Court directed counsel to
case law concerning the Statute of Frauds, and requested additional briefing regarding its
potential applicability.' At that hearing, the Court also described its understanding ofthe state of
the underlying facts, particularly as they pertained to statements made to the Defendants by the
Plaintiffs in the context ofloans made to the Van Engelen's two entities, Northwest
Developments, LLC, and Van Engelen Development, LLC. The Court stated that "to the extent
that [the statements] allegedly happened, it's my understanding that they all happened with
regard to Northwest Development." (Hearing Transcript, October 28, 2010, p. 4.) At that
hearing, the Court explicitly stated: "and if I misunderstand the state of facts, this is also your
opportunity to let me know that I misunderstand the state of facts." (Hearing Transcript, October
28,2010, p. 5-6.) This is the purpose of the 3rd Affidavit, which clarifies that, at the time the
statements were made, the Plaintiff was not soliciting business from any particular entity (3 rd
Affidavit at ~ 4); that at the time discussions were had concerning particular loans, the Van
Engelens had not yet determined which of their several entities would be involved, (3 rd Affidavit
at ~ 5); and that the Defendants had made it clear that they would not cause any of their entities
to do business with the Plaintiff if doing so required a personal guaranty, (3 rd Affidavit at ~ 6.)
I

As the Defendants explained in their supplemental briefing, the Statute of Frauds is not applicable.
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As this 3rd Affidavit was expressly invited by the Court, the Defendants did not need to seek
additional leave of the Court to file a motion to file the affidavit or otherwise seek permission
from the Court to do so.

B.

The Affidavit Does not Contain Information on New Subjects
Contrary to the Plaintiffs assertion otherwise, the 3rd Affidavit does not contain "new

allegations of fact," but is merely clarifying of facts previously presented. The case Sun Valley

Potatoes, Inc. v. Rosholt, Robertson & Tucker, 133 Idaho 1,981 P.2d 236 (1999), which the
Plaintiff cited but did not analyze for factual similarity with the present case, is instructive. Sun

Valley Potatoes was a legal malpractice case in which a client sued its former attorney for not
presenting three pieces of evidence that may have reduced the damages award that the client was
required to pay. On a motion for summary judgment, former attorney initially only presented
evidence that he had actually presented one of the three evidentiary issues. However, he did not
address the other two pieces of allegedly mitigating evidence. Then, three days before the
hearing, the former attorney submitted an affidavit asserting for the first time that the decision
not to present the other two pieces of evidence had been calculated trial decisions. The Supreme
Court determined that consideration of this late filed affidavit was inappropriate because it "was
not a supplement to the earlier factual showing made in support of its motion, but rather
presented new and different factual information." ld., 133 Idaho at 6, 981 P.2d at 241.
The circumstances that existed in Sun Valley Potatoes do not exist in this case. For
rd

example, using Paragraph 5 of the 3 Affidavit, Mr. Van Engelen explains that when he first
discussed financing with the Plaintiff, he had not yet determined which entity would take the
loan, and he made it clear that they would not cause any entity to take out a loan if a personal
guarantee was required. Unlike Sun Valley Potatoes, this is not new evidence, but is merely
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clarifying of evidence previously presented in the Supplemental Affidavit of Craig Van Engelen
nd

in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on October 27, 2010 ("the 2 Affidavit.)
rd

In the 2nd Affidavit, Mr. Van Engelen stated, much as he does in the 3 Affidavit, that "I told Mr.
Churchill: 'This is what it's going to take for you to get our business, and it's going to have to
have these three elements,' i.e ten percent down, a $50,000 interest reserve, and no personal
guarantees." (2 nd Affidavit at ~ 5.) In both affidavits, Mr. Van Engelen describes how the
Defendants had determined not to proceed with any loan from Plaintiff unless Plaintiff would
agree to not require a personal guarantee. Each of the assertions in Mr. Van Engelen's 3rd
Affidavit are likewise on factual subjects that he had previously addressed in the 2nd Affidavit;
the Affidavit of Craig Van Engelen in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, dated May
13,2010 (l st Affidavit); and/or the Deposition of Craig Van Engelen (Affidavit of Counsel in
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex.

Dl

It is clear that unlike Sun Valley

Potatoes, Mr. Van Engelen's 3rd Affidavit does not contain late evidence on new subjects, but is
merely clarifying of previously presented subjects in order to assist the Court in understanding
the case - precisely as the Court requested.

2

Compare the following:
3rd Affidavit

2nd Affidavit

I sl Affidavit

~I

~I

~I

~2
~3

~2
~3

~2

,4

,4

~7

~5

,6
,7

~~5,

6
6
"5, II

~~11,

14

~8

~12

~~II,

14, 15

~9
_,10

~9

~

~11

~~

~I2

Craig Van Engelen Deposition

p. 6:1- 9:24

~~5,

p.40:16-41:I8
p. 40: I6-4l:l8

II

'~Il, 12

5,6,7,8,
II, 12
"4,5,7,8,
II, 12

,20
'~7,

II, 14
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As the subjects of the 3rd Affidavit were actually contained in the earlier submissions of
evidence, the Plaintiff's complaint of prejudice cannot stand. Furthermore, unlike Sun Valley
Potatoes, where prejudice was found when the affidavit was submitted only three days prior to
the hearing, the 3rd Affidavit was submitted seven days prior to the hearing, which has been
rescheduled for November 12,2010. Plaintiff nevertheless argues that it is prejudiced because of
certain inconsistencies between the 1st Affidavit and the 3rd Affidavit. It even goes so far as to
malign the honesty of Defendants by accusing them of "speak [ing] out of both sides of [their]
mouth" because of this earlier inconsistency. (Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike
Affidavit, p. 6.) This is both offensive and inappropriate. Defendants are not trying to mislead
the Court, but are taking steps to correct their faulty memories. As has been testified to,
Defendants were business owners who owned many entities and were engaged in many
complicated real estate transactions. (Craig Van Engelen Depo., p. 6: 1 - 9:24.) The 1st
Affidavit, which contained the inconsistency of which the Plaintiff now complains, was filed
prior to the Defendants' opportunity to review the Plaintiff's documentation in discovery. As
Defendants have frankly admitted, their memory was incorrect in the 1st Affidavit; indeed, this is
the reason that Defendants have made their recent submissions, including the 3rd Affidavit. (3 rd
Affidavit ~ 8.) More significantly, however, Plaintiffs have neglected to mention that
Defendants corrected this error in the 2nd Affidavit, which was submitted prior to the
submission of the Plaintiff's Replv to the present Motion. As such, Plaintiff's complaint of
prejudice from such inconsistency cannot stand.
C.

The 3 rd Affidavit Does not Contain Hearsay
The Plaintiff complains that Paragraphs 5, 7, 9, and 10 of the 3rd Affidavit contain

inadmissible hearsay statements made by Kristen Van Engelen. Hearsay is, of course, "a
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statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifYing at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Idaho R. Evid. 80lCc) (emphasis added).
These paragraphs do not purport to memorialize any statement whatsoever. These paragraphs
state as follows:
5.
When I first had discussions with Brian Churchill about loans for
the Carriage Hill project, Kristen and I had not determined which of our several
entities would be involved in the development of that project or if a new entity
would be used to develop the project. Much of the decision as to which entity we
would use had to do with tax planning. As it turned out, Northwest Development
Company, LLC, and Van Engelen Development, LLC were both used in the
development of the Carriage Hill project.

7.
As discussed in my deposition, at that time I was not willing to
enter into any loans with the Bank on behalf of any of my entities if doing so
required Kristen and me to personally guaranty such loans. It didn't matter to me
which of my wholly-owned entities took out the loan, Kristen and I simply were
not willing to guaranty any loans made by the Bank. We believed that the
property we were using as collateral, at the time, was more than sufficient to
protect the Bank should a default arise.

9.
We subsequently caused another one of our entities, Van Engelen
Development, LLC, to take out the loans at issue in the instant lawsuit for the
further development of the Carriage Hill project. I cannot recall why we switched
to Van Engelen Development, LLC from Northwest Development, LLC for the
at-issue loans. To Kristen and me, it really was immaterial which entity took out
the loans, because our policy as I stated in my deposition was still the same: we
would not take out any loans on behalf of any of our entities if we had to
personally guaranty those loans. This was made clear to the Bank in our initial
conversations as well as in later conversations.
10.
Despite making it clear that we would not take out any loans if we
had to personally guaranty such loans, the Bank never disclosed to us that the
loans would be personally guaranteed. At no time during the negotiations and
closings for any of the loans taken out by entities owned by me and my wife after
those initial conversations in late 2004/early 2005, did anyone from the Bank
inform us that we had already signed guarantees and that those guarantees would
apply to the new loans taken out by our entities between 2005 and 2007. Because
we had been previously told that the loans we caused our businesses to borrow
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would not be guaranteed, I believed that the loans at issue in this lawsuit were not
guaranteed by Kristen and me. Indeed, we caused Van Engelen Development,
LLC to borrow the money from the Bank in reliance on the Bank's
representations that the loans would not be guaranteed.
To be hearsay, the declarant must transmit another speaker's out of court statement.
These paragraphs do not contain any out of court statements whatsoever, much less purport to
recount out of court statements made by Kristen Van Engelen. As such, the Plaintiff s assertion
that these paragraphs contain inadmissible hearsay is both baffling and bizarre.

It appears that the Plaintiff also argues that these paragraphs of the 3rd Affidavit are on
matters outside of Mr. Van Engelen's knowledge because he is "speculating" about the thoughts
of his wife and business partner, Kristen Van Engelen. To the contrary, Mr. Van Engelen
explains Kristen and he had made certain business decisions together. Paragraph 5 discusses that
they had not determined which entity that they would use in the development of the project. This
requires no speculation about Kristen Van Engelen's private thoughts, but is simply a statement
of fact within Mr. Van Engelen's personal knowledge. Paragraph 7 explains that they were not
willing to guarantee any loans made by the Bank. This requires no speculation about Kristen
Van Engelen's private thoughts, but explains a business decision made by the partners of the
business. Paragraph 9 reiterates their policy of not signing personal guarantees. This requires no
speculation about Kristen Van Engelen's private thoughts, but explains a business decision made
by the partners of the business. Paragraph 10 explains that Mr. Van Engelen believed that the
loans at issue were not guaranteed by Kristen or himself. This requires no speculation about
Kristen Van Engelen's private thoughts, but it actually Mr. Van Engelen's own thoughts, a
matter certainly within his own knowledge.
As these paragraphs plainly do not contain hearsay and recount matters within Mr. Van
Engelen's personal knowledge, these paragraphs are admissible and should not be struck.
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D.

Statements Made in the Affidavit are Not Barred by the Statute of Frauds
In the final sentence of the argument section of its brief, Plaintiff argues in a perfunctory

fashion that "to the extent paragraphs 6, 8, 10, and 12 ... seeks to introduced alleged terms of
an oral commitment by Washington Federal to extend credit, (each loan being in excess of
$50,000), the same are barred by Idaho Code Section 9-505(5)." (Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Strike, p. 8.) Section 9-505(5) is the Statute of Frauds, which provides that certain
agreements must be in writing to be valid. The Statute of Frauds is not an evidentiary standard
upon which statements in an affidavit might be struck. Moreover, as explained at length in their
Supplemental Brief in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, which is incorporated by
reference herein as if reproduced in full, the Statute of Frauds does not bar the Van Engelen's
defenses or bear in any way upon this case.
For the reasons stated above, the Court should deny the Motion to Strike Mr. Van
Engelen's Affidavit.
DATED this Ith day of November 2010.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC
J

-~:;;t;arJ 8Attorneys for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the Ith day of November, 2010, a true and correct copy of
the within and foregoing instrument was served upon:
David E. Wishney
Attorney and Counselor at Law
988 S. Longmont, Ste. 100
P.O. Box 837
Boise, ID 83701

D

U.S. Mail

D
D

Hand Deli very
Overnight Delivery

~ Facsimile (208) 336-5956

~~. fa~
6ara L. Parker
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David E. Wishney, I.S.B. #1993
Chad E. Bernards, I.S.B. #7441
Attorney and Counselor at Law
988 S. Longmont, Suite 100
P.O. Box 837
Boise,ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-5955
Fax: (208) 336-5956

J. DAVID

By

ORIGIN

Attorneys for Washington Federal Savings

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, a
United States Corporation,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
H. CRAIG VAN ENGELEN and KRISTEN
VAN ENGELEN,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE No. CV-OC 0917209

AFFIDAVIT OF INTEREST

----------------------------~)
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss
)

Bryan Churchill, being first duly sworn upon his oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am an Assistant Vice President and authorized representative of Washington

Federal Savings, a United States Corporation, ("Washington Federal"), the named Plaintiff

AFFIDA VIT OF INTEREST - Page 1
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in the above-captioned action.
2.

I have calculated pre-judgment interest in the amount of$543,291.98 on each

of the six (6) separate real estate development and construction loans which were calculated
from Aprill7, 2009, (the day following the non-judicial foreclosure sales) to December 9,
2010 pursuant to the various interest rates and corresponding per diem amounts as
summarized in Exhibit "A" attached hereto.
3.

That, the interest rates set forth in Exhibit "A" hereto are the non-default rates

in effect for each note as of Aprill7, 2009.
DATED this

qf::L

day of December, 2010.

BRYAN CHURCHILL, Affiant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me a Notary Public, this
December, 2010.

q1:lL

day of

AFFIDAVIT OF INTEREST - Page 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document entitled
AFFIDAVIT OF INTEREST, was served this -2- day of December, 2010, on the following by:
Thomas Banducci
Wade Woodard
DaraLabrum
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

£U.S.Mail
Hand Delivered
_ Overnight Mail
Facsimile No. (208) 342-4455

802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83702

Attorney for Washington Federal Savings
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EXHIBIT A

Loan No.

Principal

Interest
Rate

4/17/09 12/9/10

Per Diem

Accrued Interest

313170-3

$13,825.68

7.250%

601 Days

$2.75

$1,652.75

316243-5

$2,039,381.90

7.00%

601 Days

$391.11

$235,057.11

316250-0

$2,353,925.35

7.750%

601 Days

$499.80

$300,379.80

329660-5

$15,229.39

8.250%

601 Days

$3.44

$2,067.44

329683-7

$16,960.22

8.250%

601 Days

$3.83

$2,301.83

329690-2

$13,487.13

8.250%

601 Days

$3.05

$1,833.05

TOTAL PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST: $543,291.98
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David E. Wishney, I.S.B. #1993
Chad E. Bernards, I.S.B. #7441
Attorney and Counselor at Law
988 S. Longmont, Suite 100
P.O. Box 837
Boise,ID 83701
\ \I €. \)
Telephone: (208) 336-~~ C €.
,\)
Fax: (208) 336-5956
~C ~ <j 1.\l\
Attorneys for Washington

ORIGINAL

Fe~~ngS

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, a
United States Corporation,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
H. CRAIG VAN ENGELEN and KRISTEN
VAN ENGELEN,
Defendants.

)

)
)

CASE No. CV-OC 0917209

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

JUDGMENT

-------------------------------)
This matter having come before the Court upon the Plaintiff's Motion For Summary
Judgment and the Court's oral ruling from the bench on November 12, 2010 in favor of
Plaintiff, Washington Federal Savings, and good and sufficient appearing therefor;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, and this does order,
adjudge, and decree that Plaintiff Washington Federal Savings have judgment against the

JUDGMENT - Page 1
0051~

Defendants H. Craig Van Engelen and Kristen Van Engelen, jointly and severally, in the
principal sum of Four Million Four Hundred Fifty-Two Thousand Eight Hundred Nine and
6711 00 Dollars ($4,452,809.67), together with accrued pre-judgment interest from April 17 ,
2009 to December 9,2010, in the sum of Five Hundred F orty-Three Thousand Two Hundred
Ninety-One and 981100 Dollars ($543,291.98), for a total judgment in the sum of Four
Million Nine Hundred Ninety-Six Thousand One Hundred One and 65/1 00 Dollars
($4,996,101.65). Interest upon this Judgment shall accrue at the statutory rate from and after
the date of entry hereof.
Dated this

,U

day of December, 2010.

Cheri C. Copsey
District Judge

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day of December, 2010, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Judgment, to be served by first class mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to
the following:
David E. Wishney
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 837
Boise, Idaho 83701

Thomas Banducci
Wade Woodard
802 W. Bannock, Suite 50
Boise, Idaho 83702

J. OINtO

JUDGMENT - Page 2
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•

'l?ls-:::

NO'-----=:FIL£O:-;;;::--~a.-~

A.MU_ _ _~P.M......Jo_"--'."";;;;'-_
..

David E. Wishney, LS.B. #1993
Chad E. Bernards, LS.B. #7441
Attorney and Counselor at Law
988 S. Longmont, Suite 100
P.O. Box 837
Boise, 10 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-5955
Fax: (208) 336-5956

JAN 27 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By JOHN WEATHERBY
DePUTY

Attorneys for Washington Federal Savings
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, a
United States Corporation,
PlaintitTs,
vs.
H. CRAIG VAN ENGELEN and KRISTEN
V AN ENGEL EN,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE No. CV-OC 0917209

AMENDED JUDGMENT

Judgment in the sum of Four Million Nine Hundred Ninety-Six Thousand One
Hundred One and 6511 00 Dollars ($4,996, I 0 1.65) having been entered in favor of the
Plaintiff on the 14th day of December, 2010, the Plainti ff having filed its application for fees
and costs, and no objection thereto having been filed by the Defendants, and the Court having
entered an Order Granting Plaintiffs Fees and Costs in the sum of Forty Thousand Eight
Hundred Ninety-Seven and 211100 Dollars ($40,897.21), and good and sufficient appearing

AMENDED JUDGMENT - Page 1
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,,'

.
therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, and this does order,
adjudge, and decree that Plaintiff Washington Federal Savings have judgment against the
Defendants H. Craig Van Engelen and Kristen Van Engelen, jointly and severally, in the sum
of Five Million Thirty-Six Thousand Nine Hundred Ninety-Eight and 8611 00 Dollars
($5,036,998.86), plus interest thereon from the date of entry of the original Judgment herein,
December 14th, 2010, at the statutory rate on the unpaid balance until said Judgment is paid
in full.
Dated this ~ 1 day of January, 2011.

Cheri C. Copsey
District Judge
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREB Y CERTIFY that on the :;'1 day of January, 2010, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Judgment, to be served by first class mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to the
following:
David E. Wishney
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 837
Boise, Idaho 83701

Thomas Banducci
Wade Woodard
802 W. Bannock, Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83702
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NO.

FILED

185

~

A.M._---J·M,..JtC.~~-

ORIGINAL

2 5 2011
CHRISTOPHER O. RICH, Clerk
GARDEN

Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
tbanducci@bwslawgroup.com
Wade L. Woodard (lSB No. 6312)
wwoodard@bwslawgroup.com
Dara Labrum (ISB No. 7177)
dlabrum@bwslawgroup.com
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC
802 W. Bannock, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone (208) 342-4411
Facsimile (208) 342-4455

Attorneysfor Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, a
United States Corporation,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-OC 0917209

NOTICE OF APPEAL
Fee Category: L4a
Fee: $101.00

vs.
H. CRAIG VAN ENGELEN and KRISTEN
VAN ENGELEN,
Defendants.
TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS; ITS
ATTORNEYS OF RECORD DAVID E. WISHNEY AND CHAD BERNARDS,
PO BOX 837, BOISE ID 83701; AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED
COURT:
Defendants H. Craig Van Engelen and Kristen Van Engelen, pursuant to Idaho Appellate

Rule 17, hereby gives notice of appeal as follows:
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A.

Designation of Appeal: The above named Appellants H. Craig Van Engelen and

Kristen Van Engelen ("the Van Engelens") appeal against the above named Respondent,
Washington Federal Savings to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final Judgment entered in the
above-entitled action on the 14th day of December 2010 (the Honorable Cheri C. Copsey).
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 17(e)(1), this Notice of Appeal shall be deemed to include and
present on appeal all judgments, orders and decrees entered prior to the order appealed and all
orders, judgments or decrees entered after the order appealed.
B.

Jurisdictional Statement: The Van Engelens have the right to appeal to the

Idaho Supreme Court the judgments described herein pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 11(a)(l).
C.

Preliminary Statement of Issues of Appeal: The following list of issues on

appeal is preliminary in nature and is based upon such preliminary research and legal analysis as
could reasonably be conducted to date. The Van Engelens therefore reserve their right to assert
other issues on appeal.

1.

Whether the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of

the Plaintiff, conferring a judgment against the Van Engelens.
D.

Reporter's transcript: The Van Engelens request the transcript of the Hearings

on the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, conducted on October 28,2010 and
November 12, 2010. Such transcript shall be provided in electronic format.
E.

Clerk's Record: The Van Engelens request the following documents to be

included in the clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Idaho Appellate
Rule 28 1:

1 In a civil case, the Standard Record automatically includes the following: register of actions; any order sealing all
or any portion of the record; the original and any amended complaint or petition; the original and any amended
answer or response to the complaint or petition; the original and any amended counterclaim, third party claim, or
cross-claim; the original and any amended answer or response to a counterclaim; the jury verdict rendered in a jury
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1.

Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 4/6/2010;

2.

Affidavit, filed 4/6/2010, and accompanying ExhibitslAttachments
thereto, if any;

3.

Memorandum in support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed
4/6/2010;

4.

Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment or, in Alternative, Motion
for Continuance, filed 5/13/2010;

5.

Affidavit of Kristen Van Engelen in Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment, filed 5/13/2010, and accompanying ExhibitslAttachments
thereto, if any;

6.

Affidavit of Craig Van Engelen in Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment, filed 5/13/2010, and accompanying ExhibitslAttachments
thereto, if any;

7.

Affidavit of Dara Labrum in Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment/Motion for Continuance, filed 5/13/2010, and accompanying
ExhibitslAttachments thereto, if any;

8.

Notice of Vacating Summary Judgment Hearing, filed 5119/2010;

9.

Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment, filed 9130/2010, and accompanying ExhibitslAttachments
thereto, if any;

10.

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment,
filed 9/30/2010;

11.

Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 10/14/2010;

12.

Affidavit of Counsel, filed 10114/2010, and accompanying
ExhibitslAttachments thereto, if any;

13.

Plaintiffs Reply Memorandwn in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment, filed 10/2112010;

14.

Supplemental Affidavit of Bryan Churchill in Support of Summary
Judgment, filed 10/2112010, and accompanying ExhibitslAttachments
thereto, if any;

trial; the findings of fact and conclusions oflaw and any memorandum decision entered by the court; all judgments
and decrees; a list of all exhibits offered, whether or not admitted; notice of appeal and cross-appeal; any request for
additional reporter's transcript or clerk's record; a court reporter's notice oflodging with the district court; table of
contents and index, which shall be placed at the beginning of each volume of the record. I.A.R.28(b)(l)
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F.

15.

Supplemental Affidavit of Craig Van Engelen in Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment, filed 10/27/2010, and accompanying
ExhibitslAttachments thereto, if any;

16.

Supplemental Brief in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, filed
111512010;

17.

Affidavit of Craig Van Engelen in Support of Supplemental Brief, filed
1115/2010, and accompanying ExhibitslAttachments thereto, if any;

18.

Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment,
filed 111512010;

19.

Affidavit ofInterest, filed 12/9/2010, and accompanying
ExhibitslAttachments thereto, if any;

20.

Judgment, filed 12114/2010;

21.

The Deposition of Bryan Churchill, conducted on 06/28/2010, and
exhibits thereto;

22.

The Deposition ofH. Craig Van Engelen, conducted on 06117/2010, and
exhibits thereto;

23.

The Deposition of Kristen Van Engelen, conducted on 06117/2010, and
exhibits thereto;

24.

The Deposition of Gloria Henson, conducted on 06129/2010, and exhibits
thereto; and

25.

The Deposition of Dale Sullivan, conducted on 06/2812010, and exhibits
thereto.

I certify:
1.

That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of

whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below:
Reporter for the Deposition of Bryan Churchill:
Amy E. Simmons
Associated Reporting, Inc.
1618 W. Jefferson St.
Boise, ID 83702
Reporter for the Deposition of H. Craig Van Engelen and Kristen Van Engelen:
Maryann Matthews
Burnham Habel & Associates
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838 La Cassia Dr.
Boise, ID 83705
Reporter for the Deposition of Gloria Henson:
Susan L. Sims
Associated Reporting, Inc.
1618 W. Jefferson St.
Boise, ID 83702
Reporter for the Hearings October 28,2010 and November 12,2010:
Kim I. Madsen, Official Court Reporter
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front Street, Rm. 5123
Boise, ID 83702
2.

That the court reporter has been paid the estimated fee for preparation of

the reporter's transcript.
3.

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid.

4.

That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

5.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant

to Rule 20.
G.

The Van Engelens will also seek their attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho

Code § 12-120(3) and Idaho App. R. 41.
DATED this ~ day of January, 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN

~
Wade L. Woodard
Attorneys for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
10"\

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ?S day of January 2011, a true and correct copy of
the within and foregoing instrument was served upon:
David E. Wishney
Attorney and Counselor at Law
988 S. Longmont, Ste. 100
P.O. Box 837
Boise, ID 83701
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o U.S. Mail

JS: Facsimile (208) 336-5956
o Hand Delivery
o Overnight Delivery
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NO.

FILED:jrzIl

:
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David E. Wishney, LS.B. #1993
Attorney and Counselor at Law
300 W. Myrtle, Suite 200
P.O. Box 837
Boise,ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-5955
Fax: (208) 342-5749

FEB 09 2011
CHRISTOPHER O. RICH, Clerk
By ABBY GARDEN

DEPUTY

Attorney for Respondent Washington Federal Savings
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS,
a United States Corporation,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
H. CRAIG V AN ENGELEN and KRISTEN
L. VAN ENGELEN,
Defendants/Appellants.

TO:

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV OC 0917209

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL
RECORD ON APPEAL

THE ABOVE NAMED APPELLANTS AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY, AND

THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that the Respondent in the above entitled proceeding hereby
requests pursuant to Rule 19, LA.R., the inclusion of the following material in the clerk's record in
addition to that required to be included by the LA.R. and by the notice of appeal.
1.

Clerk's Record:
a.

Motion to Strike and Memorandum in Support (5/l3/1O).

b.

Response to Motion to Strike (5/19/lO).

RESPONDENT'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORD ON APPEAL - PAGE 1
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2.

c.

Notice of Withdrawal of Motion to Strike (6/17/10).

d.

Motion to Strike and Shorten Time (10/28/10).

e.

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike and Motion to Shorten Time
(10/28/10).

f.

Motion to Strike Affidavit of Craig Van Engelen (11110/1 0).

g.

Opposition to Motion to Strike Affidavit of Craig Van Engelen (11/12/10).

1 certify that this request for additional record has been served upon the clerk of the

district court and upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20. I further certify that the
estimated fee for the preparation of this additional record has been paid.
Dated this

f

day of February, 2011.

Attorney for the Respondent
Washington Federal Savings
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document entitled
RESPONDENT'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORD ON APPEAL was served this ~
day of February, 2011, on the following by:

Thomas A. Banducci
Attorney at Law
Banducci Woodard Schwartzman PLLC
802 W. Bannock, Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone:
208-342-4411
Facsimile:
208-342-4455
Email: tbandllcci@.bwslawgrollp.com

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Personal delivery
Facsimile transmission
Express Delivery
Other

Attorney for the Appellant Van Engelens

Christopher D. Rich
Clerk of the Court
200 W. Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83702-7300
Telephone:
208-287-6900

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Personal delivery
Facsimile transmission
Express Delivery
Other

David E. Wishney
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Clerk of the Court
Idaho Supreme Court
451 West State Street
Boise, Idaho 83720
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MAR 29 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RJCH,Qerk
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sc No. 38393
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WASHINGTON FEDERAL

6
7

vs.
8

VAN ENGELEN
9

10
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED
11

12
13

Notice is hereby given that on February 9, 2011, I
lodged a corrected appeal transcript of 79 pages in
length for the above-referenced appeal with the District
Court Clerk of the County of Ada in the 4th Judicial
District

14
This transcript contains hearings held on
15
16

... October 28, 2010
. . . No v e mb e r 12, 2 0 1 0

17
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20
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MADSEN
County Courthouse
200 West Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 287-7583

23
24
25
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, a
United States corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Supreme Court Case No.38484
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

vs.
H. CRAIG VAN ENGELEN and
KRISTEN VAN ENGELEN,
Defendants-Appellants.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify:
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the
course of this action.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this 28th day of March, 2011.

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the District Court

By________________~~~
Deputy Clerk
CERTIFICATE OF EXHmITS
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTOF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, a
United States corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Supreme Court Case No. 38484
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

vs.
H. CRAIG V AN ENGELEN and
KRISTEN V AN ENGELEN,
Defendants-Appellants.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of
the following:
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:

THOMAS A. BANDUCCI

DAVID E. WISHNEY

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

BOISE, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the District Court

Date of Service:

--------

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, a
United States corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Supreme Court Case No. 38484
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD

vs.
H. CRAIG V AN ENGELEN and
KRISTEN VAN ENGELEN,
Defendants-Appellants.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing
record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true
and correct record ofthe pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested by Counsels.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the
25th day ofJanuary, 2011.

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the District Court

CERTIFICATE TO RECORD

